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I. INTRODUCTION
When President Clinton announced his intention to lift the military's long-
standing rule against service by homosexuals, he set off a fire storm of controversy.
Less than two weeks after his inauguration as the "its the economy, stupid"
* Professor of Law, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University. Prior to
retiring from active duty in The Judge Advocate General's Corps, Professor Woodruff served as the
Chief, Litigation Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, where he was responsible for
defending the Army's interests in civil litigation, including litigation challenging the homosexual
exclusion policy.
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candidate, he had become the social agenda president.' Telephone calls from the
American people jammed White House and Capitol Hill switchboards. 2 "Gays and
the military" became the topic of conversation on television and radio news and talk
shows. The print media ran article after article on the issue. Everyone had strong
opinions. To some, President Clinton was striking a blow for equality and justice
that was long overdue.3 To others, he was sacrificing the best military force in the
world to repay special interest groups for their support during the campaign.4
The President's decision to lift the ban placed the senior military leadership in
the awkward position of publicly opposing the Commander-in-Chief. 5 The split in
Congress was equally dramatic with influential members of the President's own
party objecting to the President's unilateral approach to lift the ban.6 Lost in all of
the controversy, however, was an understanding of the Department of Defense
policy itself. In his January 29, 1993 press conference, the President characterized
the then-existing policy as excluding people from service based "solely on the basis
of their status."7 The President added, "I believe that American citizens who want
to serve their country should be able to do so unless their conduct disqualifies them
from doing so."' On the other hand, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Colin Powell, in defending the homosexual exclusion policy in a letter to
a member of Congress, noted that "[s]exual orientation is perhaps the most profound
of human behavioral characteristics." 9 Were the President and the General talking
about the same policy? Did the policy discriminate based upon a benign non-
behavioral characteristic, or was the policy based upon conduct and reasonable
inferences about conduct? In other words, in the context of military personnel
management policies, is sexual "orientation" or "status" unrelated to sexual
behavior?
Because the old regulatory policy has been replaced now with a statutory
policy, it would seem these are moot questions. Nothing, however, could be further
1. See, e.g., Bill Reel, Hey, Bill, It's the Economy - Remember?, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1993, at
85; David Dahl, Calls Run Against Gays in the Military, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at I A;
Editorial, Are you Homophobic?, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at G2; Richard Benedetto,
Poll: Lesser Issues Are Distracting Clinton; Economy Needs More Attention, Most Say, USA TODAY,
Feb. 3, 1993, at 8A.
2. Joyce Price, Opponents to Gays in Military Jam Lines, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 27,
1993, at 4.
3. James Carroll, The Military Needs Gays and Lesbians, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1992, at
23.
4. Some reports claim President Clinton received up to ninety percent of the gay vote and gay-
rights political action committees contributed almost three million dollars to his campaign. John Barry
& Daniel Glick, Crossing the Gay Minefield, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1992, at 26.
5. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, The Brass Dissent, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 27, 1993,
at 19.
6. Ruth Marcus & Helen Dewar, Compromise Seen On Gays in Military, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at 1.
7. Transcript of President Clinton's News Conference, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 30, 1993,
at 12.
8. Id.
9. Letter from Gen. Colin Powell to Rep. Patricia Schroeder, May 8, 1992, reprinted in CRISIS,
July/Aug. 1992, at 46.
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from the truth. The answers to these questions provide the philosophical compass
that sets the course for the interpretation and implementation of the statutory policy
passed by Congress in 1993.10
This Article examines the old regulatory policy (hereinafter "1981 homosexual
exclusion policy"), its application, and judicial interpretation to establish a
benchmark from which to compare the post-January 1993 policy developments. The
Article then examines the administrative policy announced by President Clinton on
July 19, 1993, and compares it to the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy. The
Article also analyzes the statutory policy enacted in late 1993 and its
constitutionality to see how Congress approached the issues, as well as the
Department of Defense's implementation of the statutory policy to determine
whether the implementing directives have followed the policy determined by
Congress. Finally, this Article concludes that significant differences exist between
the statute passed by Congress and the subsequent implementing regulations.
II. THE 1981 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATORY POLICY
A. Institutional and Philosophical Context
1. The Role of the Armed Forces in American Society
To understand and appreciate the issues that produced this intense national
debate, one must consider the context in which the Department of Defense
homosexual exclusion policy operates: the American Armed Forces. The American
Armed Forces are unique. In a government based upon the consent of the governed,
the military is autocratic. In a society that treasures individual freedom, the soldier
must conform and sacrifice individual freedom for mission accomplishment. In a
country where the right to speak one's mind is paramount, the soldier is called upon
to defend that right while not enjoying its full extent. To some, it is paradoxical that
the defenders of freedom must forfeit their own freedom. Consider the mission of
the military, however, and the paradox vanishes. The mission of the United States
Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation's wars. It takes an army to do that, not
a debating society. The Supreme Court has long-recognized "the differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that 'it is the
primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars ....
To accomplish this unique, important, difficult, and dangerous business of
fighting wars, the military forces have many requirements that have no parallel in
civilian society. Soldiers are not free to "call in sick" if they do not feel like
working. Soldiers are not permitted to vote on whether to take the objective by a
10. See National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 546, 107 Stat. 1670
(1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West Supp. 1994)).
11. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
See also In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890) ("An army is not a deliberative body. It is the
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command
in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier."). For a discussion of the needs and purposes
of a military in a democratic society and the resulting impact on servicemen's claims of constitutional
rights violations, see James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness &
Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177 (1984).
1995]
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frontal assault or a flanking movement. They are not given the option of wearing
button-down collars or the latest fashion trend. Theirs is the duty of obedience to
the lawful orders of their superiors. Wars are won not by individuals, but by units
functioning together under extremely difficult circumstances. In short, military
service requires the soldier to subordinate individual desires to the needs of the
group; to eschew personal prerogatives for the sake of unit success; to place
accomplishment of the mission before attainment of private goals. This overarching
principle of conformity and unit cohesion undergirds the discipline and the
teamwork necessary to train, maintain, and employ an effective fighting force. As
the Supreme Court noted in Goldman v. Weinberger,'2 "[t]he essence of military
service 'is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the
needs of the service. "'13
In the final analysis, all military rules, regulations, policies, traditions, and
customs are related to, and in some manner support, the ultimate goal of combat
effectiveness. The 1981 homosexual exclusion policy, like other personnel policies,
was a component of the force management equation that sought to build a military
force that was trained, disciplined, ready, and able to defend the nation's interests
whenever and wherever called.
2. Individual Rights v. Military Readiness
While the impact of homosexuality on these important concerns has been, and
still is, the subject of considerable debate, the perspective from which one
approaches the debate is as important as resolving the underlying issues themselves.
Specifically, is the debate one of policy centered on individual rights, or is it a
debate about how best to raise and support an effective and efficient armed forces?
Answering this question establishes the perspective from which the various
arguments must be viewed and is a fundamental prerequisite to properly analyzing
the arguments of both sides. Ultimately, this is a philosophical or ideological
question. While we may look to our constitutional history and the allocation of
power among the various branches of government for guidance, the answer to this
question is really a philosophical or ideological position rather than a legal one.
Proponents of eliminating the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy have argued
the policy denies homosexuals the "right" to serve their country.14 Phrasing the
debate in terms of individual rights allows opponents of the policy to cloak their
position in the garb of the civil rights movement. Viewing the issue from the
individual rights perspective places the burden on the military to justify the
exclusion policy. Because the military has not conducted controlled experiments to
12. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
13. Id. at 507 (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
14. See, e.g., Troy R. Holroyd, Comment, Homosexuals & the Military: Integration or
Discrimination?, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 429,453 (1992); Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment,
Analyzing the Military's Justifications for Its Exclusionary Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational
Basis, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 211 (1992); Janine M. Dascenzo & Neal A. May, Comment,
Cleaning Out the Pentagon's Closet: An Overview of the Defense Department's Anti-Gay Policy, 23
U. TOL. L. REv. 433,467 (1992); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion
Policy: Text & Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685, 710 (1992).
[Vol. 64:1
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generate empirical data in support of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy, critics
claim the policy does not have a rational basis and must fall in the face of an
individual rights attack.15 This perspective permits critics of the policy to rely upon
some celebrated cases of homosexuals who served successfully as refuting the
military's justification for the policy. Because the military has not produced any
empirical data to the contrary, critics are then able to assume their own argument
and dismiss "professional military judgment" as a euphemism for prejudice. 6
Viewed from the perspective of the needs of the military, on the other hand,
the debate indeed takes a different approach. The burden of proof shifts. Opponents
of the policy must demonstrate that eliminating the exclusion of homosexuals will
enhance the military's ability to perform its mission of fighting and winning wars.
From this perspective, "professional military judgment" is significant. The question
then turns on whether the Chiefs of Staff of the services, and military leaders such
as General Norman Schwartzkopf are better qualified to develop personnel policies
that promote combat readiness and efficiency than are the leaders of the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force and other gay rights organizations. This perspective
is significant considering the fact that gay rights activists have yet to make a case
for improving, or at least not hindering, combat effectiveness by eliminating the
1981 policy.1
7
The "individual rights" perspective is illustrated by the Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Military Freedom Project, a coalition of organizations interested in
furthering the gay rights movement. The Military Freedom Project presented the
Clinton-Gore transition team with a comprehensive agenda for integrating
homosexuals and bisexuals into the military. 8 The agenda called for an executive
order "ending discrimination on the basis of homosexual or bisexual orientation or
conduct in the armed forces."' 9 It also demanded establishment of an advisory
committee to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense on "all matters
relating to homosexuals and bisexuals in the armed forces."2 The agenda urges
"prompt reform" of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2' to remove the possibility
of criminal sanctions for consensual homosexual sodomy. 2 In addition, the
15. See, e.g., Hermansen, supra note 14.
16. See id. at 195-209.
17. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. Lawrence Korb, a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense, who now favors lifting the exclusion policy, acknowledged the
experimental nature of eliminating the policy: "All my research and experience tells me that the
question of whether the presence of openly gay men and women in the armed services would
undermine fighting effectiveness cannot be answered definitively until the policy is actually changed."
Prepared Statement of Lawrence J. Korb on Homosexuals in the Military and Unit Cohesion before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 31, 1993, at 1, [hereinafter Korb Statement ], reprinted
in Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 255-56 (1993) [hereinafter S. Hrgs.].
18. See David Evans, Gay Activist Agenda on the Military Goes Far Beyond Tolerance,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 1993, at 23.
19. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Military Freedom Project Recommendations for Accepting
Homosexuals and Bisexuals into the U.S. Armed Forces, (1)(A) [hereinafter Project
Recommendations].
20. Id. (I)(B).
21. 10 U.SC. §§ 801-946 (1988).
22. See Project Recommendations, supra note 19, $ (2)(A).
1995]
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document urged reparations for all those discharged for homosexuality under
previous policies and a comprehensive training program to teach commanders,
chaplains, doctors, military policemen, and ordinary soldiers that homosexual
conduct is acceptable.23
Significantly, the document did not mention national defense. It did not
concern itself with whether this ambitious agenda for social engineering will have
any adverse impact, in either the short or long term, on combat effectiveness. The
agenda omitted any reference to the possible impact on unit cohesion, trust, and
confidence that might occur when soldiers are required to live under conditions of
minimal or no privacy with individuals of the same gender who may find them
sexually attractive. The Military Freedom Project agenda did not concern itself with
what might happen when sexual tensions in a combat unit disrupt the unit's ability
to fight as a team. It did not even acknowledge the mission and role of the Armed
Forces in American society. The agenda's sole purpose was to further the interests
of homosexuals as individuals and as a group. It did not even attempt to address
legitimate concerns of military readiness and combat effectiveness.
Other proponents of change have also confused national priorities. Dr.
Lawrence Korb, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense who now favors lifting the
1981 homosexual exclusion policy, testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on this issue. His position typifies the up-side-down logic of proponents
of individual rights over military necessity:
Regardless of their position on this issue, no responsible person, particularly
someone who has served on active duty with the military, would desire to take
any step which he or she knew would permanently undermine the unit cohesion
or fighting effectiveness of our armed forces. However, the burden of scientific
proof must be on those who wish to exclude gays from the military. We cannot
infringe on the rights of any American to serve his or her country unless we can
convincingly demonstrate that the presence of that person in a unit would
prevent the development of cohesion even with the most competent and highly
motivated leadership.24
Carefully consider what Dr. Korb said. First, he pays homage to unit cohesion
and fighting effectiveness and warns against knowingly taking some action that
would permanently hinder combat effectiveness. Apparently, Dr. Korb finds it
acceptable to take action that could temporarily hinder our ability to defend national
interests; we need only hope that some crisis requiring combat force does not
present itself during that time of temporary ineffectiveness. He also implies it is
acceptable to take action that would permanently hinder effectiveness as long as we
did not know that it would have such consequences. According to Dr. Korb, as long
as we do not have the mens rea to hinder national defense, experimentation with our
national defense forces is perfectly acceptable. In short, Dr. Korb would have the
entire country bear the risk of failure instead of denying a particular individual his
or her "right" to serve in the military.
23. Id. (3)(C), (3)(D), & (4).
24. Korb Statement, supra note 17, at 1.
[Vol. 64:1
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Second, Dr. Korb not only elevates individual rights over the needs of the
military, but he gives us an interesting insight into the quantum of evidence required
to sustain the policy. Note that he requires "scientific" proof to justify the policy.
Instead of allowing military leaders with combat experience to tell us what it takes
to fight and win wars, Dr. Korb defers to "science" as if this issue was capable of
scientific certainty or resolution. Furthermore, he believes the "scientific" evidence
must "convincingly demonstrate" the wisdom of the policy. In other words, doubts
should be resolved in favor of the individual and against military readiness concerns.
Finally, Dr. Korb proposes that "any American" should be able to serve unless
we can "convincingly demonstrate that the presence of that person" would disrupt
unit cohesion even with the best leadership available. Carried to its logical
conclusion, Dr. Korb proposes a new and radical qualification standard that is so
focused on individual desires that the needs of the military do not even appear in the
equation. "Any American" would include the physically handicapped, the mentally
retarded, the elderly, the young, the felon, the drug addict, the emotionally
immature, and a host of others who fit in categories that are not considered generally
appropriate for military service. Furthermore, Dr. Korb seriously proposes that any
and all of these should be permitted to serve. Only after they are in the military and
''convincingly demonstrate" that their presence detracts from the unit's ability to
perform its mission would discharge be appropriate. Such egalitarian notions may
be appropriate for social clubs and civic groups, but they are hardly conducive to
building combat forces.
Perhaps the most sobering aspect of Dr. Korb's proposal is his forthright
admission that "the question of whether the presence of openly gay men and women
in the armed services would undermine fighting effectiveness cannot be answered
definitively until the policy is actually changed. 25 In spite of this, however, he and
the gay rights groups advocate implementing their social experiment with no
consideration of a risk-benefit analysis to national defense and society in general.
In their view, individual rights are paramount and the impact upon societal interests
and norms are simply irrelevant until someone "convincingly demonstrates" the
experiment is a failure.
If the purpose of the military is to provide equal employment opportunity to
all who wish to serve, then individual rights should take precedence over other
concerns. If the military is to perform a national defense role and be ready to project
combat power whenever and wherever necessary, then combat readiness concerns
must dictate personnel policies. To ask this question is to answer it. The only
reason to maintain an army is to be ready to fight and win wars. Ultimately, military
readiness and combat effectiveness must be the criteria by which the arguments on
either side of the issue are judged.
This fundamental philosophical choice explains why the judiciary gives such
deference to the military. In this regard, it is important to repeat what the Supreme
Court observed in Goldman: "The essence of military service 'is the subordination
of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service."'' 2 6 To
elevate individual rights above the needs of the service and the military's ability to
wage war is the antithesis of military service. When individual free speech rights
25. Id.
26. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83, 92 (1953)).
1995]
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conflict with the need for discipline, free speech must yield." When an individual's
free exercise of religious rights conflicts with the military's requirement for
uniformity, the need for uniformity prevails.28 When the military's interest in good
order is inconsistent with the procedural protections afforded civilian criminal
defendants, good order is paramount.29 When an individual's claims of racial
discrimination threaten a commander's authority to discipline his subordinates, equal
protection remedies available in civilian society give way to the need for military
discipline.30 When personal political views of a soldier are inconsistent with mission
orders, the mission takes precedence. 3'
By the same token, when special interest groups seek to use the military to
enhance their own social and political agenda, any doubts about the impact of their
proposal on military efficiency and combat readiness must be resolved in favor of
the professional military judgment of those charged with leading our military in
combat. To do otherwise sacrifices matters of national importance on the altar of
self-interest and pays homage to individual rights at the expense of combat
readiness. Emphasizing and accommodating individual rights at all costs is a poor
substitute for establishing sound national policy.32
B. The Historical Context33
The military's policy, like the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the laws
of the states that criminalize sodomy, derives from a long history of general
condemnation of homosexual conduct. Sodomy was punished by the ecclesiastic
courts of the early and medieval church and was made a secular offense under a
statute of Henry VIII. 34 Sodomy was held in such opprobrium that Blackstone
referred to the mere mention of sodomy as a "disgrace to human nature. 35 Because
sodomy was an offense over which the civilian courts had jurisdiction, it was not
specifically included in the military codes until the 18th century when it became
punishable under the Laws Relating to the Government of His Majesty's Ships,
Vessels, and Forces by Sea. 36 Similarly, sodomy was not included in the early
27. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
28. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503.
29. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
30. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
31. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
32. "Our rights-laden public discourse easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and the
personal dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the moral, the long-term, and the social
implications." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
171 (1991).
33. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 263-67 (1993); see generally RANDY SHILTS,
CONDUCT UNBECOMING, LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY, VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF
(1993); MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE (1993). For a
thorough and detailed review of the development and history of both the enlistment and separation
policy for homosexuals, see Richard Rosen, Homosexuals and the Military (University of Virginia
School of Law 1985) (unpublished).
34. 25 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1533) (Eng.).
35. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215-16.
36. 22 Geo. 2, art. 29 (1749) (Eng.).
[Vol. 64:1
HeinOnline  -- 64 UMKC L. Rev. 128 1995-1996
HOMOSEXUALITY AND MILITARY SERVICE
American military codes because it was punishable by the civilian courts under the
common law adopted from England. During World War I, however, the Army
prosecuted sodomy under the Manual For Courts-Martial, 1917.37 Congress included
sodomy as a separate offense under the Articles of War in 1920.38
Early enlistment and discharge regulations did not mention homosexuality or
sodomy. Indeed, they were all very general and offered enlistment to "[n]one but
men of good character, sound in body and mind, of good appearance, and well
formed and fit, in every particular. . . ,,39 After World War I, Army regulations
provided for the discharge of soldiers who evidenced "habits or traits of character
which serve to render retention in service undesirable," or who were "disqualified
for service, physically or in character, through [their] own misconduct. 4 °
During World War II, the Army discharged homosexuals administratively.
4
'
In January 1944, the War Department issued Circular No. 3, which specifically
provided for the disposition of homosexuals. 42 It reminded commanders that
homosexual conduct was punishable under the Articles of War, but that
administrative separation often served the military's best interests. The circular
distinguished between "true or confirmed" homosexuals who were not "reclaimable"
and "first offenders" whose conduct may have been influenced by drugs, alcohol,
immaturity, curiosity, or undue pressure by a superior.43 If the "confirmed"
homosexual's conduct was not aggravated by independent offenses, the circular
recommended administrative discharge as the appropriate measure, otherwise, court-
martial was appropriate. 44 "First offenders" were subject to medical evaluation and
treatment and, depending upon the success of the treatment regimen, were either
retained on active duty, administratively separated, or, if otherwise justified, court-
martialed for sodomy.45
37. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1446, § 111(5) (1917).
38. Articles of War, 1920, art. 93, 41 Stat. 805, ch. 227 (1920). Sodomy was included as an
offense under article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1950).
39. GEN. REGS. FOR THE ARMY, 1841, art. 49, 1679 (emphasis in original).
40. DEP'T OF ARMY REG. No. 615-360,9149 (Mar. 1, 1926).
41. Administrative separations are not criminal prosecutions. Only a court-martial can issue a
dishonorable discharge, a bad conduct discharge, or in the case of an officer, a dismissal. Current
regulations characterize administrative discharges as honorable, general, or other than honorable
depending upon the nature of the individual's service. While the procedural protections available to a
soldier facing administrative elimination are not the same as those available in a criminal prosecution,
the administrative separation is not a punitive action, it cannot impose a period of confinement or other
"sentence," and is not a criminal or quasi-criminal conviction. The administrative separation is the
military equivalent to a civilian employer firing an employee. See generally I FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN &
FREDERICI. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 3-22.00 (1991). For an account of the conversion
from a criminal approach to homosexuality to an administrative approach, see ALLAN BERUBE, COMING
OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two 128-48 (1990).
42. WAR DEP'TCIRC. No. 3, HOMOSEXUALS (Jan. 3, 1944).
43. Id. I 2b.
44. Id. 12a.
45. Id. I 2b.
1995]
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By 1950, Army regulations provided for separation of "[t]rue, confirmed, or
habitual homosexual personnel, irrespective of sex.... ." The regulation separated
homosexual cases into three different categories. A "Class I" case involved
homosexual acts accompanied by some aggravating factor such as assault, coercion,
or involvement of children.47 Cases involving "true or confirmed homosexual
personnel" who committed homosexual acts without the aggravating factors were
placed in "Class II."14 8 "Class III" cases were limited to "those rare cases wherein
personnel only exhibit, profess, or admit homosexual tendencies and wherein there
are no specific, provable acts ...."-'
As might be expected, the disposition of the case depended upon the class in
which it fell. Class I cases were tried by general court-martial." Enlisted personnel
in a Class II category could either accept an undesirable discharge (officers could
resign) or face general court-martial.51 Class III cases involving enlisted personnel
were subject to involuntary administrative separation if the soldier declined a
discharge, which could be either general or honorable depending upon the
circumstances. 2
Over the next two decades, personnel policies generally required separation of
homosexuals, but continued to classify those whom the regulations considered
"reclaimable" and permitted them to serve. In 1970, Army regulations abandoned
the "confirmed" and "reclaimable" classifications and were amended to separate for
"unfitness" soldiers who committed homosexual acts. Soldiers who merely had
homosexual "tendencies" were separated for "unsuitability.""
Problems with the policies of all three services were highlighted in a series of
federal court decisions in the late 1970s. Under the Air Force and Navy policies, it
appeared that commanders had authority to retain homosexuals on active duty under
"unusual circumstances." Neither service, however, defined what circumstances
were sufficiently unusual to justify retention. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the discharges of two homosexual
servicemen because they were not given an opportunity to demonstrate they
qualified for the exception. 4
The Army policy fared no better. A District Court in Wisconsin enjoined the
discharge of an admitted lesbian because the Army policy prohibiting service by
individuals with homosexual "tendencies" was potentially so broad that it violated
First Amendment and privacy rights."
46. DEP'T OF ARMY REG. No. 600-443, PERSONNEL-SEPARATION OF HOMOSEXUALS 2 (Jan.
12, 1950).
47. Id. 3a.
48. Id. 3b.
49. Id. 3c.
50. Id. 6.
51. DEP'T OF ARMY REG. No. 600-443, PERSONNEL-SEPARATION OF HOMOSEXUALS 7a, b
(Jan. 12, 1950).
52. Id. 8.
53. DEP'T OF THE ARMY REG. No. 635-212, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS-DISCHARGE: UNFITNESS
AND UNSUITABILITY (I)(6)(b)(6) (Jan. 21, 1970).
54. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berg v.
Claytor, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. See benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975-77 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
[Vol. 64:1
HeinOnline  -- 64 UMKC L. Rev. 130 1995-1996
HOMOSEXUALITY AND MILITAR Y SER VICE
In response to these challenges and demonstrated deficiencies, the Department
of Defense assembled representatives of the services to review and revise the policy
to satisfy constitutional standards and to provide for a uniform policy throughout the
Department. The result of the this effort was Department of Defense Directive
1332.14, pertaining to the administrative separation of enlisted members, and
Department of Defense Directive 1332.30, which governs the separation of
officers. 6 The new policy, which was promulgated in the waning days of the Carter
56. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, encl.
8 (Jan. 15, 1981); DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.30, SEPARATION OF REGULAR
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS FOR CAUSE, encl. 2 (Jan. 15, 1981), reprinted in 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A,
(H) (1994). The policy provides:
a. Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who,
by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct, seriously impair the accomplishment of the military mission. The
presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services
to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and
confidence among servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system of
rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of
servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close conditions
affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military
Services; to maintain public acceptability of military service; and to prevent
breaches of security.
b. As used in this section:
(1) Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts;
(2) Bisexual means a person who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual and heterosexual acts; and
(3) A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying
sexual desires.
c. The basis for separation may include preservice, prior service, or current
service conduct or statements. A member shall be separated under this section
if one or more of the following approved findings is made:
(1) The member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another
to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are approved further
findings that:
(a) Such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior;
(b) Such conduct under all the circumstances is unlikely to recur;
(c) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation by the member during a period of military service;
(d) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the Service is consistent with the interest of
the Service in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(e) The member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless
there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual.
(3) The member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of
the same biological sex (as evidenced by the external anatomy of the
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administration, addressed the deficiencies of the earlier policies by eliminating the
"unsuitability" discharge for "homosexual tendencies" found objectionable by the
court in benShalom v. Secretary of the Army." To insure consistent application
among the services, the policy clarified that separation was mandatory for
individuals who were homosexuals within the meaning of the Directive. This
clarification eliminated the undefined "unusual circumstances" which the courts
relied upon in overturning the discharges in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force" and Berg v. Claytor 9 To add clarity, the policy defined "homosexual" as
one who "engages in, intends to engage in, or desires to engage in homosexual acts,"
and defined "homosexual acts" as "bodily conduct, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between persons of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires."6"
C. Operational Context
An agency's written regulation can best be understood and appreciated by
examining the agency's own interpretation of its regulation. 6' The 1981 homosexual
exclusion policy is no exception. The consistent agency interpretation and
application of the policy reveals the policy was an exclusion policy premised upon
the policy determination that "[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military
service." As an exclusion policy, it had two basic components, (1) an accession
mechanism designed to screen out homosexuals prior to their entering military
service, and (2) a discharge mechanism to separate those who entered the military
in spite of the accession screening mechanism. The policy was premised on the
judgment of military professionals that homosexual conduct in the unique setting of
the military was inimicable to good order, discipline, unit cohesion, and combat
effectiveness.62
The policy operated on the logical conclusion that as a class, homosexuals
engaged in or were likely to engage in homosexual activity. In order to reduce, if
not eliminate, the instances of homosexual activity in military units, the policy
persons involved) unless there are further findings that the member is not
a homosexual or bisexual and that the purpose of the marriage or attempt
was the avoidance or termination of military service.
57. 489 F. Supp. at 977.
58. 591 F.2d at 860.
59. 591 F.2d at 851.
60. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, encl.
8 (Jan. 15, 1981); DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.30, SEPARATION OF REGULAR
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS FOR CAUSE, encl. 2 (Jan. 15, 1981), reprinted in 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A,
(H). Both Directives were republished in 1982.
61. See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (stating that an "agency's construction
of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference"); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864,
872 (1977) (holding that "[i]n construing administrative regulations, 'the ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation") (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414
(1945)); see generally Susan K. Goplen, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal
Interpretations After Leckmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1993).
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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excluded from service the category most closely associated with homosexual
activity: homosexuals.
At accession, recruits were asked if they "intended to engage in . . .
homosexual acts .... "63 Enlistment forms also asked, "Are you a homosexual or
bisexual? ('Homosexual' is defined as: sexual desire or behavior directed at (a)
person(s) of one's own sex. 'Bisexual' is defined as: a person sexually responsive
to both sexes.)"'  An affirmative answer precluded enlistment.65
For those who entered military service or continued in military service in
violation of the policy by either lying in response to the questions at enlistment or
for those who answered truthfully but subsequently realized they were homosexual,
the policy required discharge when one or more of the following criteria were met:
(1) the individual engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage
in homosexual acts;' (2) the individual admitted he or she is a homosexual; 67 (3) the
individual married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same sex.68
When presented with probable cause that any of the above conditions existed,
commanders were required to initiate separation proceedings.69 Service regulations
provided the soldier with certain due process rights in the proceedings, including the
right to notice of the proceedings, the right to legal counsel, the right to cross-
examine witnesses, the right to present evidence and witnesses, and the right to
either remain silent or testify in his or her own behalf.70 Separation was required if
the Board determined the individual was a homosexual within the meaning of the
Department of Defense Directive.71
If the basis for the separation proceeding was that the soldier engaged in,
attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in homosexual acts, the
separation board could recommend retention only by finding: the conduct in
question was a departure from the soldier's usual behavior, the conduct was unlikely
to recur, it was not accompanied by force or coercidn, that under the circumstances
retention of the soldier would be consistent with good order, morale, and discipline,
and the soldier does not desire or intend to engage in homosexual acts in the future.
In other words, if these additional factors were present, the soldier did not fall within
the definition of the excluded class and discharge for homosexuality was not
required.72 Similarly, where the basis of separation was marriage or attempted
63. DEP'T OF DEFENSE FORM 1966/2, RECORD OF MILITARY PROCESSING-ARMED FORCES OF
THE UNITED STATES, block 27 (Jan. 1989).
64. Id.
65. Similar questions were asked of officers upon appointment and of those entering pre-
commissioning programs such as Reserve Officers Training Corps. See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY FORM
597-3, ARMY SENIOR ROTC SCHOLARSHIP CADET CONTRACT, Part (1)(2)(f) (July 1992).
66. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, encl. 3, Part 1, (H)(1)(c)(1) (Jan. 28, 1982).
67. Id. (H)(l)(c)(2).
68. Id. I (H)(I)(c)(3).
69. Id. (H)(3)(a).
70. Id. at Part 3, (C).
71. DEP'TOF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.14, encl. 3, Part 1, 1 (H)(3)(b)(1) (Jan. 28, 1982).
72. Id. This aspect of the regulation seems to be the modem equivalent of the "reclaimable"
homosexual addressed in earlier versions of the policy. Here, however, the regulation does not purport
to "cure" or provide "treatment" for homosexuality, it merely recognizes a person may engage in a
homosexual act and not, in fact, be a homosexual. While administrative discharge for homosexuality
is not appropriate in those circumstances, the military is free to apply the criminal provisions of the
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marriage to a person of the same sex, the regulation permitted retention if the Board
determined the individual was not a homosexual within the meaning of the
Department of Defense Directive.7"
The Department of Defense policy also required separation of those who
disclosed their homosexuality by their own statements, unless the separation board
found they were not homosexuals within the meaning of the Department of Defense
Directive. The admission of homosexuality placed the soldier in an excluded class;
a class defined by conduct or the propensity to engage in conduct the military
determined was inimicable to good order, morale, unit cohesion, and ultimately,
combat effectiveness. Because the definition of homosexual was tied to sexual
conduct rather than to amorphous concepts of sexual tendencies, preferences, or
orientation, the policy presumed that one who claimed to be a homosexual has, will,
or was likely to engage in the conduct that defines the class.74 To overcome the
effect of the presumption, the soldier had the burden of proving that he or she was
not a member of the excluded class, i.e., he or she was not a homosexual. The
administrative elimination process, with its panoply of rights and procedural
protections, including the right to cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses, and to
introduce evidence, provided the servicemember with the opportunity to rebut the
presumption that he or she was, in fact, a member of the excluded class. If the
servicemember failed to rebut the presumption that he or she engages in, intends to
engage in, or desires to engage in homosexual acts, i.e., he or she was a homosexual,
the soldier's voluntary claim to be a member of a class that is defined by its sexual
conduct or propensity to engage in such conduct was sufficient to warrant discharge.
Discharging soldiers based solely upon their self-identification as a
homosexual without additional evidence of homosexual conduct avoided the
necessity for intrusive investigitions and inquiries into the soldiers' sexual practices.
Furthermore, because it is reasonable to believe homosexuals will engage in the
conduct that defines the class, discharging those who claim to be homosexuals
served the goal of preventing the disruption and adverse impact upon unit readiness,
morale, and discipline that homosexual conduct within the military environment
causes.
Uniform Code of Military Justice to the conduct in question or to apply its other administrative
measures, including discharge. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY REG. No. 635-200, PERSONNEL
SEPARATIONS-ENLISTED PERSONNEL (Oct. 17, 1990).
73. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1332.14, encl. 3, Part I, (H)(1)(c)(3) (Jan. 28, 1982).
Retention would only be appropriate if the separation authority determined that the servicemember was
not a homosexual or bisexual and the marriage was not entered into in an attempt to avoid service.
While the "Corporal Klinger" exception avoided discharge for homosexuality, it did not preclude
application of other administrative or disciplinary sanctions. See id. (H)(3)(g).
74. Presumptions are procedural rules to allocate the burden of production of evidence or the
burden of persuasion, or both, in trials. See generally 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, §§ 342-345 (4th ed. 1992). For example, a letter properly addressed, with the proper
postage affixed, and deposited in the mail is presumed to have been delivered to the addressee. If the
party against whom the presumption operates is to avoid the effect of the presumption, that party bears
the burden of producing evidence to show that the letter was in fact not delivered, Id. § 343.
Similarly, the law presumes that a child born to a woman during her marriage is the legitimate child
of her husband. The party challenging paternity bears the burden of producing evidence to overcome
the presumption of paternity. Id.
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D. Judicial Review of the 1981 Homosexual Exclusion Policy
Judicial challenges to the 1981 regulatory policy evolved over the years from
attacks based upon the process used to separate homosexuals, to claims that the
policy infringed constitutionally protected privacy interests and First Amendment
free speech rights, to arguments that it violated the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. With few exceptions, these judicial
challenges have been uniformly unsuccessful.
The long line of judicial authority upholding the 1981 homosexual exclusion
policy is due in large part to the traditional deference the courts give the military in
managing internal military affairs.7" This deference is grounded in the recognition
that the Constitution gives the Executive and Legislative branches authority over
military affairs and the judiciary lacks the expertise required to make the
professional judgments needed to manage the operations of the Armed Forces.76
1. Procedural Due Process
Most of the early challenges to the military's homosexual policy attacked the
procedures employed to separate the individual from the service. In the
constitutional sense, procedural due process is triggered by the government's
infringement of some protected property or liberty interest." When protected
interests are implicated, the individual is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Determining the timing, scope, and formality of the notice and hearing, i.e.,
the process that is due, requires balancing competing private and governmental
interests.78 Complicating the procedural due process theory of plaintiffs challenging
expulsion from the military is the fact that courts have been virtually unanimous in
holding there is no property or liberty interest in continued service in the military.79
Thus, discharge from the military does not, in and of itself, implicate constitutional
guarantees of procedural due process. Only if the discharge falsely stigmatizes the
individual will notions of constitutional procedural due process come into play.8"
75. See Goldman v. Weinberg, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749 (1974); Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
See also Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence in Military
Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557 (1994).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). See also
James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness & Servicemen 's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177 (1984).
77. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
78. In determining the precise contours of the process that is due in particular circumstances, the
Supreme Court has applied a balancing of interests approach that considers first, the private interests
at stake; second, the degree to which the procedures employed safeguard the protected interests from
erroneous deprivation; and third, the government's interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency and
what burden additional protections would impose. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
79. See Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 278-279 (4th Cir. 1991).
80. As the Guerra court noted, a soldier may, in the abstract, have a liberty interest in his good
name or reputation and if the military falsely stigmatizes the soldier with a less than honorable
discharge, the Due Process Clause is implicated. Guerra, 942 F.2d at 278 (citing Wisconsin v.
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Obviously, when a soldier voluntarily proclaims that he or she is a homosexual and
is discharged according to the established policy, it simply cannot be said that the
military has falsely stigmatized the individual.8 ' Accordingly, it is now well settled
that the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy does not violate the procedural due
process component of the Fifth Amendment.
8 2
Though it does not usually rise to constitutional levels, the process employed
to effect a discharge is, however, important and may confer on the servicemember
procedural rights and protections that a court will enforce. To a large extent, the
process to which a servicemember is due in the administrative separation context is
determined by the service regulations themselves. In other words, the regulations
providing for discharge also establish the procedural protections due the service
member.
The courts have, of course, required the military to follow its own regulations
in conducting administrative separations. In fact, two of the cases that scuttled the
predecessor to the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy dealt with claims that the
services failed to follow their own regulations and denied the plaintiffs the
procedural protections of the regulations. Both Berg v. Claytor a and Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force4 involved allegations that the plaintiffs were discharged
for homosexual activity without being told why their cases did not come within the
"unusual circumstances" exception to discharge contained in Navy and Air Force
regulations. The D.C. Circuit found the regulations "provided that in cases of this
type a reasoned explanation should be made for any detrimental action ordered; [t]he
whole system of regulations is infused with this concept."85 The failure to provide
the "reasoned explanation" required by the regulations denied the plaintiffs
knowledge of the grounds for the decisions and precluded the court from exercising
its proper function of judicial review of agency actions.8' The discharges were
overturned and the cases were returned to the services for action in conformity with
the regulations.8 7
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). The key to invoking a protected liberty interest is the
falsity of the government's asserted basis for the discharge. If the underlying basis for discharge is
true, whether it involves drug use as in Guerra or homosexuality as in Rich v. Secretary of the Army,
735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984), the discharge action does not falsely stigmatize the individual and
protected liberty interests are not infringed.
81. See Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228.
82, See id. at 1220; Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 905 (1981); see also Holroyd, supra note 14, at 432-34.
83. 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
84. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
85. Id. at 859.
86. Id. at 857. The difficulty of relying upon the agency-provided benefits and protections is
the agency is free to change them. After the Berg and Matlovich decisions the Department of Defense
revised the policy and removed the "unusual circumstances" language thereby precluding future
challenges to discharges on those grounds. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
87. Prompted by the Matlovich court's decision, the Department of Defense revised the policy
to eliminate the procedural vagaries that allowed the plaintiffs to avoid discharge. Curiously, the court
itself invited the Defense Department to solve the problem by revising the policy. The court noted the
services could follow one of two approaches to the problem: either change the policy under its rule-
making authority to provide a "generalized approach to a general problem ... "or continue to handle
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A more recent application of this "administrative" or "regulatory" due process,
though not specifically denominated as such by the court, is Meinhold v.
Department of Defense.8 8 Keith Meinhold was a twelve-year Navy veteran who in
1992 declared on a national television news program that he was, "in fact, gay."
The Navy did what the Department of Defense policy required in such situations and
instituted separation proceedings to provide Meinhold the opportunity to establish
that he was not a homosexual within the meaning of the policy. Because the policy
presumed one who claims to be a homosexual will engage in the conduct that
defines the class and because Meinhold did not challenge the logical presumption
of homosexuality that his statement raised, as he had the right and opportunity to do,
the administrative proceedings concluded Meinhold was in fact a homosexual (i.e.,
one who "engages in, desires to engage, or intends to engage in homosexual acts"' )
and discharged him from the Navy. After his discharge, Meinhold sued to overturn
his discharge and obtained a preliminary injunction reinstating him to duty while the
case was pending." On cross motions for summary judgment, the court found the
policy violated Meinhold's right to equal protection, made the preliminary
injunction reinstating him permanent, and enjoined the Department of Defense from
"discharging or denying enlistment to any person based on sexual orientation in the
absence of sexual conduct which interferes with the military mission of the Armed
Forces."'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the regulations as applied by the Navy
raised serious constitutional claims.92 Instead of deciding if the policy actually
violated Meinhold's constitutional rights, however, the court opted to re-interpret
the policy to avoid the constitutional issue altogether. 3 The court found the policy
called for discharge based upon a statement of homosexuality only if the statement
reflected a "fixed or expressed desire to commit homosexual acts despite their being
prohibited. '94 Finding Meinhold's statement did not contain such a fixed or
expressed desire, the court reasoned the Navy misapplied its regulation to Meinhold
and affirmed the district court's order reinstating him.95 Thus, the court determined
the policy, as the court interpreted it, was constitutional. The policy, however, was
applied improperly to Meinhold. It was the Navy's misapplication of its
the issue on a case-by-case basis. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 861. The case-by-case adjudication carried
with it the greater possibility of uneven results and the court suggested the rule-making power was
preferable. The Defense Department agreed. The Defense Department eliminated the "unusual
circumstances" exception and changed the homosexual exclusion policy in 1981 to require discharge
in every case. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
88. 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, end. 3, Part 1, (H)(1)(b)(1) (Jan. 28, 1982).
90. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1993). The
government opposed this unusual relief but lost the issue when the court struck the government's brief
because it exceeded the local rule page limits. Meinhold, Order, Nov. 6, 1992.
91. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1458. The Supreme Court stayed application of the injunction
pending appeal in so far as it purported to grant relief to anyone other than Meinhold. Department of
Defense v. Meinhold, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
92. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 1477.
94. Id. at 1479.
95. Id. at 1479-80.
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constitutional policy that caused Meinhold harm, not a "correct" application of an
unconstitutional policy.96
2. Substantive Due Process
Attacks on the policy based on substantive due process grounds have fared no
better than those alleging procedural due process violations. Substantive due
process requires the governmental policy, rule, regulation, or action bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose.97 If the basis of the due process
challenge is that the government action infringes upon constitutionally protected
rights or privileges, whether enumerated or found in penumbras, the government
must show a compelling interest rather than just a rational basis to survive
constitutional scrutiny.98 Whether challenged as violating a fundamental right,
denying homosexuals' privacy rights, or infringing upon free speech guarantees,
with few exceptions, courts have had no trouble determining the 1981 homosexual
exclusion policy did not infringe protected rights and that it bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.99 One court even subjected the
policy to heightened scrutiny and found that it passed constitutional muster.'00
The notable exception was the district court in benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 01 a case challenging an earlier version of the policy. Miriam benShalom was
a member of the Army Reserve who admitted her lesbianism. The Army had no
evidence of homosexual conduct, other than her profession of lesbianism, and
96. In reinterpreting the policy to avoid the constitutional issues, the Meinhold court relied upon
the principle that it must "construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476 (quoting DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). The policy at issue
in Meinhold was a regulatory policy as opposed to a statute, however, application of the DeBartolo
principle would seem to require the court to reach the constitutional question because the court's
construction of the policy was "plainly contrary" to the long-standing interpretation of the policy by
both the agency and the courts. Furthermore, the Meinhold court's reinterpretation of the policy to
avoid the constitutional questions does not mean that the Navy's original interpretation of the policy
was, in fact, unconstitutional. Other courts have upheld the policy as interpreted and applied by the
Navy. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). In fact, the Meinhold court itself
acknowledged the Navy's interpretation was at least "arguably . . . [rational] in the abstract."
Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479. Under a rational basis equal protection review such a finding is all that
is required to pass constitutional muster: "[a] classification 'must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification; ... courts are compelled under rational basis review to accept ... generalizations
even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends .... ' Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,
2642-43 (1993).
97. See, e.g., 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 15.1-15.7 (1992).
98. Id. § 15.4.
99. See, e.g., Marsh, 881 F.2d at 454; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.
1984).
100. See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
101. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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discharged her for "homosexual tendencies" under the earlier policy. The court
found the policy unconstitutionally infringed benShalom's right to privacy in her
personality, was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, and was arbitrary
and capricious because the Army could not establish a nexus between her admission
of homosexuality and her demonstrated performance of duty. The Army did not
appeal and benShalom was reinstated.'°2
In light of the change in the policy in 1981 to eliminate the vague "tendencies"
language and the recent decision by the Seventh Circuit upholding the 1981
homosexual exclusion policy in a subsequent suit brought by benShalom, 113 it is safe
to say there is little or nothing left of the district court's substantive due
process/fundamental rights analysis.
3. Free Speech
Because the most controversial aspect of the military's policy has been the
discharge of those who state they are homosexual and about whom the military has
no extrinsic evidence of homosexual conduct, some have claimed the policy violates
Free Speech rights protected by the First Amendment.'" While discharging a
person for uttering the words "I am a homosexual" certainly involves "speech" in
a generic sense, the courts have been unanimous in concluding the 1981 homosexual
exclusion policy did not infringe First Amendment free speech rights.'05
The First Amendment does not protect every word that comes out of a citizen's
mouth. To qualify for First Amendment protection in a public employment context,
the speech must first be about a "matter of legitimate public concern ' as opposed
102. The litigation, however, was far from over. As previously noted, the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled against the military in Berg and Matlovich. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text. Those two decisions and the district court decision in benShalom prompted the Department of
Defense to revise the policy. The new policy was promulgated in January 1981 and benShalom was
denied reenlistment under the revised policy. She again sued and the district court again found the
policy unconstitutional. See benShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989). This time,
however, an appeal was taken and the constitutionality of the policy was before the appellate court.
The Seventh Circuit, noting the difference between civilian and military life, found that constitutional
guarantees that may apply in a civilian setting are not applicable in the unique setting of the military's
need for obedience, discipline, loyalty, and team work. The court also found the matter was more
appropriately addressed by the political branches of government rather than by judges who "are not
selected on the basis of military knowledge." benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). Accordingly, the court held the policy did not violate the
plaintiffs constitutional rights and reversed the district court's order requiring the Army to reenlist
benShalom. Id. at 466.
103. Marsh, 881 F.2d at 454.
104. See Brent H. Allen, Note, The First Amendment & Homosexual Expression: The Need for
an Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1073 (1994); Phyllis E. Mann, Note, If the Right of
Privacy Means Anything: Exclusions from the U.S. Military on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 46
SMU L. REV. 85 (1992); Gisela Caldwell, Note, The Seventh Circuit in benShalom v. Marsh: Equating
Speech with Conduct, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 421 (1991).
105. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992); Marsh, 881 F.2d at 454; see also WELLS-PETRY, supra note
33, ch. 2.
106. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
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to a mere revelation of "matters only of personal interest."' 0 7 Concluding that
speech is a matter of public concern does not end the inquiry. Rather, it merely
triggers the application of a test to balance the individual's interest in making the
statement against the governmental interests furthered by the policy "restriction" on
the speech.
The weakness in plaintiffs' attempts to invoke Free Speech rights has not been
an inability to convince courts to tip the scales in their favor upon balancing the
relative interests. The impediment to the Free Speech theory has been the refusal
by courts to consider the statement "I am a homosexual" to merit constitutional
protection in the first instance. Making a statement in public does not necessarily
mean the statement reaches a matter of public concern. Rather than being a
statement of public concern, a revelation of one's homosexuality in the military
personnel context is merely acknowledgment of membership in a class that is
excluded from service. Thus, the statement was a statement of identity; evidence
that the servicemember was a member of a class that was not eligible for service.
Accordingly, the threshold requirements for First Amendment protection were not
satisfied and, therefore, Free Speech rights were not implicated.'o8
4. Equal Protection
It is well settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has an
equal protection component which applies to the federal government the same
standards the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the
states.' O9 Equal protection analyses test the propriety of dispensing governmental
benefits or burdens, or both, based upon class groupings or distinctions. When
government action impacts similarly situated classes differently, equal protection
review evaluates whether the class distinctions are appropriate means to further the
government goals. Class distinctions drawn along lines of race or national origin,
or which burden the exercise of fundamental rights, are subject to strict scrutiny. 10
To withstand this level of review, the classification scheme must be necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest."' Classification schemes that do not
implicate fundamental rights and are not based on race or national origin need only
pass a rational basis review." 2 Under this deferential standard of review, the courts
will uphold the challenged classification unless it is clear the classification bears no
rational relationship to any legitimate governmental interest. 1 3 An intermediate
107. Id. at 147.
108. See benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990) (stating identity makes the service member ineligible for military service, not the speaking of
it aloud); Pruitt, 943 F.2d at 992 (stating the discharge resulted not from the content of the speech, but
from being a homosexual).
109. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See generally ROTUNDA, supra note
97, § 18.1.
110. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); ROTUNDA, supra note 97, §§ 18.3, 18.8.
111. ROTUNDA, supra note 97, § 18.8.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
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level of review, sometimes referred to as "heightened scrutiny," is usually applied
to gender and illegitimacy classification schemes." 4 Intermediate or heightened
scrutiny asks whether the "quasi-suspect" classification scheme is substantially
related to a legitimate government interest.
Equal protection challenges to the military homosexual policy initially argued
that homosexuality shared the same characteristics as race or national origin and
should be considered a suspect class. While gathering some support from
commentators and individual judges,"5 the final decisions of the courts addressing
the issue have unanimously concluded that homosexuality is not a suspect class and
strict scrutiny of the military policy is not warranted."6 Furthermore, while at least
one court has applied and upheld the policy under heightened scrutiny,' 17 no court
has ever held that homosexuals are a "quasi-suspect" class. Thus, equal protection
challenges to the policy must proceed under the rational basis level of review.
Like other constitutional challenges, the equal protection claim has been
embraced by commentators" 8 and some lower courts,' '9 but rejected by the courts
of appeals.' The most recent, and probably one of the last cases arising under the
1981 homosexual exclusion policy that will ever reach the court of appeals, 2' is
Steffan v. Perry,22 the celebrated case of midshipman Joseph Steffan who was
disenrolled from the Naval Academy shortly before graduation when he disclosed
his homosexuality. Steffan resigned from the academy rather than insisting on
taking his case through the complete elimination process. Some eighteen months
later, however, he had second thoughts and wrote the Secretary of the Navy asking
that he be allowed to complete his studies. The Secretary refused and Steffan sued.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected Steffan's
argument that homosexuals are a "suspect class" for equal protection analysis and
114. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender).
115. See Watkins v. United States Army,.875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
116. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1990); benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Rich
v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
117. SedIatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 864 (1981); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905 (1981).
118. Holroyd, supra note 14, at 445-51; Dascenzo & May, supra note 14, at 452-62; Renee
Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEx. L. REv. 205 (1993);
Robert D. Stone, The American Military: We're Looking for a Few Good [Straight] Men, 29 GONZ.
L. REV. 133, 153-161 (1993/1994); Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28
U.S.F. L. REv. 919, 937-42 (1994).
119. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Dahli v. Secretary of the
Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
120. See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 677; Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991); Marsh, 881 F.2d
at 454; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1068; Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich, 735
F.2d at 1220; Belier, 632 F.2d at 788.
121. But see Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 910.
122. 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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upheld the regulations under rational basis review.'23 Steffan appealed and a panel
of the D.C. Circuit found the policy violated the Equal Protection component of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court reversed the district court and
ordered the Secretary to "grant Mr. Steffan his diploma from the United States
Naval Academy, reinstate him to military service, and commission him as an
officer."' 24
Upon rehearing en banc the full court found there was no dispute over the
authority of the military to discharge one who engages in homosexual conduct,
whether on or off duty.'25 It was also conceded that the Constitution permits
discharge of those who have an "intention" to engage in homosexual conduct.'26
Thus, the court was faced with "whether banning those who admit to being
homosexual rationally furthers the end of banning those who are engaging in
homosexual conduct or are likely to do so."'1
27
The court found the policy presumed that when a servicemember claimed to
be a homosexual, "that member means that he [or she] either engages or is likely to
engage in homosexual conduct.' ' 28 In rejecting Steffan's equal protection claim, the
court found "the class of self-described homosexuals is sufficiently close to the class
of those who engage or intend to engage in homosexual conduct for the military's
policy to survive rational basis review."'' 29
In the final analysis, the overwhelming weight of judicial authority clearly
supports the constitutionality of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy. While
individual district court judges may have disliked the policy and ruled it
unconstitutional, every circuit court of appeals to directly address the
constitutionality of the policy has held the policy was constitutional. 3 '
123. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
124. Steffan v. Aspin, 8F.3d 57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d
677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
125. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684.
126. Id. at 685.
127. Id. at 685 (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 686.
129. Id. at 686-87. While no final decision of an appellate court has ever held the 1981
homosexual exclusion policy violated equal protection analysis, the Ninth Circuit has ruled it was error
for a district court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim without considering whether the
complaint could be construed to present an equal protection claim. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989
(9th Cir. 1991). Several district courts have ruled the presumption of homosexual conduct the policy
raised upon a revelation of homosexuality is illogical and thus failed rational basis review. See
Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States
Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993). The Steffan court characterized these decisions as
"undisciplined rebellion against the governing constitutional doctrine." Steffan, 41 F.3d at 689.
130. See, e.g., 41 F.3d at 677; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990), reh "g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990); benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th
Cir. 1984).
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III. THE POST-JANUARY 1993 POLICIES
A. Background
If the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy seemed impervious to constitutional
attacks, why then was it necessary to address the issue in the form of either a new
executive policy or positive legislation? The time-worn rule "if it ain't broke, don't
fix it" would seem to apply. The answer can be found, not in court decisions, law
review articles, legal briefs, or even footnotes to Supreme Court opinions. The
firestorm of controversy that engulfed this issue in late 1992 and 1993 was produced
by an ideological and political shift, not a jurisprudential movement.
From a military personnel management viewpoint, the 1981 homosexual
exclusion policy was easily applied at the unit level and the policy had been upheld
repeatedly by the courts. From 1981 to 1992, however, the battle over gay rights,
at least insofar as the military policy was concerned, had moved from the courtroom
to the political arena. Most gay activists had come to accept the fact that the
appellate courts and the Supreme Court were not going to second guess the military.
Rather than placing its hopes in the courts, the gay-rights movement began to place
more emphasis on securing change through the political branches.' 3' The election
of Bill Clinton and his campaign pledge to lift the ban gave the movement a new
burst of energy. The presidential election changed not the policy, but the policy
maker. The issue of gays in the military would now be viewed from a different
ideological and philosophical perspective.
As early as September 1992, the Senate Armed Services Committee was
committed to examining the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy.' 32 After President
Clinton's inauguration, news reports indicated the President was going to make
good his promise to lift'the ban. On January 29, 1993, the President directed the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy
and prepare an executive order "ending discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed Forces."' 33 He also
announced an interim policy that would suspend asking recruits about any
homosexual conduct and would place in the inactive reserves, pending the
Secretary's development of a new policy, servicemembers who were processed for
discharge upon admissions of homosexuality.'34 The Secretary was given until July
15, 1993, to formulate the new policy.
On February 4, 1993, two amendments were proposed to the Family and
Medical Leave Act'35 that dealt with the homosexual issue. One would have frozen
all military personnel policies concerning homosexuals as they existed on January
1, 1993. The other expressed the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of
131. See SHILTS, supra note 33, at 284-85, 388-90.
132. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 267 (1993) [hereinafter S. REP.].
133. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Ending Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation in the Armed Forces (Jan. 28, 1993).
134. See Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1369 (July 19, 1993).
135. Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 601,- Stat.- (1993).
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Defense should conduct a comprehensive study of the issue and report his findings
to the President and to Congress by July 15, 1993. It also called for the Senate
Armed Services Committee to conduct "comprehensive hearings on the current
military policy with respect to the service of homosexuals" and "oversight hearings
on the Secretary's recommendations .... 136
While the Military Working Group, appointed by the Secretary to develop the
Presidential Executive Order, was formulating recommendations for the Secretary
and the President, Congress began its own consideration of the issue. Both the
House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee held
hearings and received a wide range of testimony from interested individuals and
organizations. 37 The Senate Armed Services Committee even visited military
installations and naval vessels to gain insight into the actual conditions of military
living and to gauge the impact of any policy change on the troops.'38
B. The July 19th Policy
On July 19, 1993, the Secretary delivered and the President announced the
long-awaited results of the Administration's policy review. According to the
President, his new policy would have these essential elements:
One, service men and women will be judged based on their conduct, not their
sexual orientation. Two, therefore the practice, now 6 months old, of not asking
about sexual orientation in the enlistment procedure will continue. Three, an
open statement by a service member that he or she is a homosexual will create
a rebuttable presumption that he or she intends to engage in prohibited conduct,
but the service member will be given an opportunity to refute that presumption;
in other words, to demonstrate that he or she intends to live by the rules ....
And four, all provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice will be enforced
in an even-handed manner .... And thanks to the policy provisions agreed to
by the Joint Chiefs, there will be a decent regard to the legitimate privacy and
associational rights of all service members. 39
The July 19th "policy" was actually a memorandum from the Secretary of
Defense directing the service secretaries to develop regulations implementing the
President's essential elements."4 Thus, detailed service regulations and Department
136. Id.
137. The Senate Armed Services Committee conducted hearings on the policy generally on March
29, 31; April 29; May 7, 10, and 11. Oversight hearings on the Administration's July 19th policy were
held on July 20, 21, and 22, 1993. S. Hrgs., supra note 17. Oversight hearings in the House were held
July 21, 22, and 23, 1993. Assessment of the Plan to lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the Military:
Hearings before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter H. Hrgs.].
138. S. REP., supra note 132, at 268-70.
139. Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1369 (July 19, 1993).
140. Secretary of Defense News Release, No. 605-93, Subject: Directives Implementing the New
DoD Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (Dec. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Sec. Def. Dec.
22nd News Release].
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of Defense directives implementing the new policy had not been drafted when the
President made his announcement. The policy guidelines issued with the
Secretary's July 19th memorandum identified three areas where the new policy
would operate: (1) accessions; (2) discharges; and (3) investigations.
The accessions policy stated that "[a]pplicants for military service will no
longer be asked or required to reveal if they are homosexual or bisexual, but
applicants will be informed of the conduct that is proscribed for members of the
armed forces, including homosexual conduct."'' This concept was essentially the
same as the interim policy established in January 1993 when the military suspended
asking applicants to disclose whether they were homosexual or if they engaged in
or intended to engage in homosexual conduct. This aspect of the policy obviously
gave rise to the "don't ask" label.
The discharge guidance noted that:
Sexual orientation will not be a bar to service unless manifested by homosexual
conduct. The military will discharge members who engage in homosexual
conduct, which is defined as a homosexual act, a statement that the member is
homosexual or bisexual, or a marriage or attempted marriage to someone of the
same gender.'42
The third aspect of the July 19th policy dealt with guidelines concerning
investigations and inquiries into allegations of homosexuality. Detailed guidelines
and procedures had not been developed when the policy was announced. Rather,
the July 19th memorandum noted merely that investigations and inquiries would not
be used "solely to determine a servicemember's sexual orientation."' 43 It also
directed commanders to initiate investigations or inquiries only "when there is
credible information that a basis for discharge or disciplinary action exists."'" The
policy guidelines also provided that something more than a mere allegation by
another that a servicemember was homosexual was required before initiating either
a commander's inquiry or a criminal investigation.'45
As written, the policy guidance was a rather marked departure from the
previous 1981 homosexual exclusion policy, and from military personnel policies
generally. As a rule, military personnel policies are designed and developed to
further military interests in unit cohesion, combat readiness, and military
effectiveness. The July 19th guidance introduced a new purpose: providing "greater
protection to those who happen to be homosexual and want to serve their country
.... ,146 The policy guidance reiterated the President's determination not to base
military service determinations on sexual orientation and specifically declared that
"sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual
141. Id.
142. Id. As a broad policy guideline, the July 19th discharge policy is similar to the 1981
homosexual exclusion policy. As will be more fully developed below, however, the July 19th policy
actually departs dramatically from the theory and structure of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy
where discharge for an admission of homosexuality is concerned.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News Release, supra note 140.
146. Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lest1ians in the Military, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1369 (July 19, 1993).
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orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by
homosexual conduct.'1
47
The memorandum introduced "sexual orientation" into the military lexicon and
defined it as "a sexual attraction to individuals of a particular sex."' 48 Conversely,
the policy removed from the military lexicon the defined class "homosexual" that
the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy excluded from military service.149 Thus, the
President's July 19th policy eliminated the class that the previous policy excluded
from service and created a new defined class of "sexual orientation" that was
specifically authorized to serve.
The policy also continued the interim practice of not asking recruits if they
engaged in homosexual acts or if they desired or intended to engage in homosexual
acts.
The policy guidance did, however, purport to incorporate the same discharge
criteria that existed under the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy. In other words,
under the July 19th policy soldiers would be discharged if they engaged in or
attempted to engage in homosexual acts, married or attempted to marry another
person of the same biological sex, or revealed their homosexuality through a
statement. 50 While the acts and marriage discharge criteria were precisely the same
as the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy, the statements provisions rested on a very
different theory.
Under the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy, a statement of homosexuality
was viewed as an act of identification; it placed the individual in a class excluded
from service. The July 19th policy, however, eliminated the previously excluded
class and created a new class or category that was not excluded from service:
homosexual orientation. This class of "orienteers" was not part of the regulatory
scheme prior to July 19th. Under the previous policy, the only defined class to
which a statement of homosexuality could possibly refer was to the class
"homosexual;" a class the directives defined by conduct and the propensity to
engage in certain conduct. The statement was an act of identification that placed the
individual in the excluded class. Under the July 19th policy, however, a statement
of homosexuality could not identify the individual as a member of an excluded class
because the only class defined by the July 19th policy was the included class of
orientation. Thus, the theory supporting discharge for a statement of homosexuality
under the July 19th policy was not that the statement was an act of identification, but
that the statement revealed specific misconduct on the part of the service member.'51
147. Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News Release, supra note 140.
148. Id.
149. Id. See also S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 771 ("We simply took out the middle part, the
reference to homosexual. .. .'); id. at 804 ("Also ... we have eliminated the terms 'homosexuality'
and 'homosexual' as unnecessary to the analysis.") (testimony of Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel,
Department of Defense).
150. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
151. S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 805. Ms. Gorelick continued:
We used to say, in the... [1981 homosexual exclusion] policy, "If you say you are a
homosexual, we will presumptively conclude that you are." What is a homosexual under
our policy? Someone who engages in acts or has a propensity or intent to do so. So we
say now, "If you say you are a homosexual, we presumptively conclude that you engage
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The policy raised a presumption of misconduct even though the member may have
only been referring to his or her orientation, a characteristic the policy itself declared
to be unrelated to conduct and, thus, non-disqualifying. To avoid this obvious
illogic of discharging someone for merely revealing what the military declared to
be a non-disqualifying characteristic, the policy defined the statement of
homosexuality as "homosexual conduct."' 52 Because uttering the words "I am gay"
was now defined as conduct, the July 19th policy could claim the policy was based
upon "conduct" and not "status."'
' 53
The Attorney General reviewed the July 19th policy and informed the
President that the new policy contained three aspects that improved the ability of the
Justice Department to defend the policy against court challenges.' 54 First, the
Attorney General noted that separating sexual orientation from homosexual conduct
as a matter of policy would require the military "to judge an individual's suitability
for service on the basis of conduct, and homosexual conduct (but not an
unmanifested orientation) would be grounds for separation from service.""'55
Second, according to the Attorney General, the status-conduct distinction embodied
in the July 19th policy "suggests a meaningful opportunity to rebut the presumption
flowing from statements of homosexuality; [and,] [a]s a consequence, the
Department of Justice will be better able to argue that the policy is not directed at
speech or expression . .,,56 Finally, the Attorney General opined that the July
in acts or have a propensity or intent to do so." We have simply taken out the
intervening point of: what is a homosexual?
Id.
152. See Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News Release, supra note 140.
153. In the rhetoric surrounding this issue, discrimination based upon "status" has been the demon
the Clinton Administration most wanted to slay. Critics of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy
repeatedly claim a policy that denies individuals the privilege of serving in the Armed Forces solely
because of their "status" as homosexuals violates common sense, basic fairness, and a host of other
virtues. What is overlooked in this claim is the characteristics of the "status" at issue. "Status" is not
a self-defining term. Unlike racial "status," which is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic, unrelated
to any particular conduct or pattern of conduct, homosexual "status" is only accorded to those who
engage in, intend to engage in, or have a propensity to engage in a certain type of behavior or conduct.
See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating "homosexual status is accorded to
people who engage in homosexual conduct, and people who engage in homosexual conduct are
accorded homosexual status"). Thus, the "status" at issue in the homosexual policy is a status that is
defined by and inextricably linked to conduct. In addition to the clear distinction between a benign
"status," like race, and a behavioral "status" like homosexuality, military personnel policies routinely
"discriminate" on the basis of categories or status. For example, those who fall within the "status" of
being a single parent are denied enlistment. Individuals with the "status" of a non-high school
graduate are not qualified to serve. Those whose "status" is measured by age, either too young or too
old, are similarly not qualified for enlistment. Thus, the underlying issue is not whether the
homosexual policy discriminates upon "status." The real issue is the characteristics of the "status" and
what impact those characteristics have upon unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. As previously
noted, the "status" of homosexual is inextricably linked to homosexual conduct and no court has ever
questioned the authority of military to eliminate homosexual conduct from within the ranks. See.
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
154. Memorandum for the President from the Attorney General, Defensibility of the New Policy
on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter Atty Gen'l Memo.].
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 2. In this Author's opinion this statement is rather incredible when one stops to
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19th policy was an improvement over the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy
because the policy decision to not question service members "about their sexual
orientation or behavior" and to allow commanders to "initiate investigations only
where there is credible evidence of 'homosexual conduct' . . . will make decisions
made under the [July 19th] policy appear fairer, more even-handed, and conduct-
based, and therefore easier to defend."' 157
The Attorney General's memo is remarkable in that it reflects a poor
understanding of both the operation of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy and
the long line of judicial authority upholding that policy against constitutional
challenges. The memo hails the creation of the status-conduct distinction as an
important element in improving the ability of the Department of Justice to defend
the policy in court. The judicial opinions upholding the 1981 homosexual exclusion
policy, on the other hand, pointed to the absence of such a distinction as an
important aspect in the policy's ability to pass constitutional muster. 58 Furthermore,
contrary to the Attorney General's statement that separating conduct and status
would strengthen the defense against a First Amendment challenge, the 1981
homosexual exclusion policy's equating conduct with status was the element that
precluded plaintiffs from being able to even state a claim under the First
Amendment. 159 Handing an opponent in litigation a legal theory or claim with
which to attack you, even if you think you can ultimately prevail, hardly seems like
a stronger approach than denying the opponent the claim in the first instance.
Finally, the Attorney General's view that a policy precluding questioning
service members about their "sexual orientation or behavior" would end the practice
of conducting investigations "for the sole purpose of determining an individual's
sexual orientation" misperceives the basis of the 1981 homosexual exclusion policy.
As noted, 6' "sexual orientation" was not a defined term, characteristic, or class
under the 1981 policy. Discharges were not issued on the basis of "sexual
orientation." The 1981 homosexual exclusion policy did not attempt to adopt or
conform to the language of the gay rights movement. Nor did it venture any further
into the realm of human sexuality than was necessary to safeguard legitimate
military interests in preserving unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. The defined
class that was excluded from service was "homosexual," and the class definition was
based upon conduct and the propensity to engage in conduct. In reality, the
Attorney General was saying the July 19th policy was easier to defend than the
straw-man policy to which she was comparing it.
consider that every appellate court to consider the issue, including the Ninth Circuit whose judges
seemed most hostile to the policy, held that plaintiffs challenging the 1981 homosexual exclusion
policy could not even state a claim under the First Amendment. It is difficult to imagine, therefore,
how the July 19th policy could improve upon the unanimous line of authority holding the 1981 policy
impervious to First Amendment attacks.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990).
159. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir.
1991); Marsh, 881 F.2d 454.
160. See Att'y Gen'l Memo., supra note 154.
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The congressional oversight hearings began the day after the President
announced the Administration's new policy. From July 20th to the 23rd, 1993, the
Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of each of the services, and
key members of the Military Working Group appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee to explain the policy guidance to members of Congress.
Secretary Aspin told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "[t]he policy
does important things; [a] service member who may be homosexual can serve under
this policy without lying and without fear of 'witch hunts."""' General Powell told
Congress the July 19th policy "permits gay and lesbian Americans to serve if they
are willing to keep their orientation a private matter.' 62 Despite the wording of the
July 19th memorandum, the President's speech, Secretary Aspin's statement that
under the July 19th policy "[a] homosexual can serve," and General Powell's
explanation that the policy "permits gay and lesbian Americans to serve," all of
which were marked departures from the prior exclusion policy, 63 the detailed
testimony from the DoD officials who developed the policy was that the July 19th
policy guidance was not a departure from the prior policy. The Service Chiefs, the
DoD General Counsel, and members of the Military Working Group all assured
Congress the July 19th policy carried forward the substance of the old policy. In
describing the concept of the July 19th policy guidance, DoD General Counsel,
Jamie Gorelick, assured Congress that "we kept the legal structure [of the old
policy]."'" Upon close questioning by members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Ms. Gorelick noted the July 19th policy differed from the previous
policy in only three, relatively minor areas: (1) service members would not be asked
about their sexual orientation; 65 (2) that administrative inquiries into allegations of
161. S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 703. The elimination of "witch hunts" was apparently the
motivation for including limitations and guidelines on conducting investigations into allegations of
homosexuality. The term "witch hunt" was never defined in either the congressional hearings or the
materials released by the Military Working Group. The scenarios associated with the term ranged
from a criminal investigation into allegations that a ring of lesbians was coercing Marine female
recruits into homosexual acts in the barracks at Camp Lejune to claims that military criminal
investigators used heavy-handed interrogation techniques to force homosexuals to reveal the identities
of other homosexuals in the unit. The wide disparity of situations to which the term applied indicates
that a "witch hunt" depended upon the subjective view of the individual rather than on any objective
criteria.
162. Id. at 709.
163. The 1981 policy was an exclusion policy that defined a class and excluded that class from
service without individual determinations. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text. While some
homosexuals no doubt served in spite of and in violation of the policy, they were not serving dejure.
The July 19th policy, on the other hand, accommodated homosexuals' service rather than excluding
them completely.
164. See H. Hrgs., supra note 137, at 170.
165. See S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 790. The notion that the previous policy required service
members to divulge their sexual orientation is one of the major misunderstandings of this entire matter.
The enlistment form completed at accession asked if the recruit engaged in or desired to engage in
homosexual acts. It also asked the recruit if he or she was a homosexual and defined homosexual with
reference to homosexual conduct or the intent or desire to engage in homosexual conduct. See supra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Thus, even under the July 19th policy's definitions, the prior
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homosexuality would not be initiated unless the commander had credible
information that a basis for discharge existed; and (3) criminal investigative
resources would not be used absent reason to believe a crime had been committed. 6
The obvious discrepancy between the written policy, the explanation of the
policy given by the President, Secretary Aspin, and General Powell, on the one
hand, and the testimony of other DoD and military leaders on the other, raised
serious questions in the minds of key Congressional leaders as to the wisdom of the
July 19th policy. Senator Coats expressed concern that the courts would "find
inconsistencies in the policies as written" and interpret them in a way that would
hinder the goal of maintaining military effectiveness and unit cohesion. 167 Senator
Nunn noted that he shared Senator Coats' "apprehension along the same line."'
' 68
In the House, Representative Talent commented,
when I listened to the Chiefs and the Secretary yesterday, what I basically heard
them saying was that they had resolved this debate in favor of essentially
keeping the old policy .... [but] [w]hen I read the policy as a totality .... [it]
doesn't seem to be consistent with what I understood the Secretary and the
Chiefs have been saying about the policy. 69
C. The 1993 Statutory Policy
These unsettling differences between the July 19th policy as written and the
explanation of the policy given by the DoD General Counsel and the members of the
Military Working Group and the constitutional authority of Congress to "make the
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,"' 7° led the
Senate Armed Services Committee to draft a statutory policy and include it as part
of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994."'7
policy did not question recruits about their sexual orientation.
166. S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 790.
167. Id. at 798.
168. Id.
169. H. Hrgs., supra note 137, at 191-92.
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14.
171. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 546, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. A. § 654 (West
Supp. 1995)). The statute provides:
6 5. Pnlicv nn,.emino hnmnsev,,olt,, . the .- A _=,-... s
(a) Findings.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits
exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies,
provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces.
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces.
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of the
Constitution of the United States, it lies within the discretion of the
Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the
armed forces.
(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail
in combat should the need arise.
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(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of the armed forces
to make extraordinary sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in order
to provide for the common defense.
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion,
that is, the bonds of trust among individual service members that make
the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the
combat effectiveness of the individual unit members.
(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that-
(A) the extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique
conditions of military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion,
require that the military community, while subject to civilian
control, exist as a specialized society; and
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs,
and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior,
that would not be acceptable in civilian society.
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate a
member's life for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the
member enters military status and not ending until that person is
discharged or otherwise separated from the armed forces.
(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, apply to a member of the armed forces at all times that the
member has a military status, whether the member is on base or off base,
and whether the member is on duty or off duty.
(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is necessary
because members of the armed forces must be ready at all times for
worldwide deployment to a combat environment.
(12) The worldwide deployment of United States military forces, the
international responsibilities of the United States, and the potential for
involvement of the armed forces in actual combat routinely make it
necessary for members of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living
conditions and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and
characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-standing element
of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances
of military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons
whose presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to
the armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.
(b) Policy.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more
of the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures
set forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further
findings, made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in
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such regulations, that the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the
interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and
morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or
words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved
in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the
member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage
in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to
be of the same biological sex.
(c) Entry standards and documents.-
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the standards for enlistment
and appointment of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set
forth in subsection (b).
(2) The documents used to effectuate the enlistment or appointment of a
person as a member of the armed forces shall set forth the provisions of
subsection (b).
(d) Required briefings.-The briefings that members of the armed forces receive
upon entry into the armed forces and periodically thereafter under section 937
of this title (article 137 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) shall include
a detailed explanation of the applicable laws and regulations governing sexual
conduct by members of the armed forces, including the policies prescribed
under subsection (b).
(e) Rule of construction.-Nothing in subsection (b) shall be construed to require
that a member of the armed forces be processed for separation from the armed
forces when a determination is made in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of Defense that-
(1'1 th . ;n onduct cr made statements for the parpose of
avoiding or terminating military service; and
(2) separation of the member would not be in the best interest of the armed
forces.
(f) Definitions.-In this section:
(1) The term "homosexual" means a person, regardless of sex, who engages
in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual acts, and includes the terms "gay "and "lesbian".
(2) The term "bisexual" means a person who engages in, attempts to engage
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual and
heterosexual acts.
(3) The term "homosexual act" means-
(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
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Analysis of the statutory language and the legislative history reveals the statute
was a codification of the 1981 policy in all material respects. First, the statute
appears in Chapter 37, United States Code, General Service Requirements, rather
than in Chapter 59, Separations. Thus, the statute is not merely a discharge or
separation policy, but is a limitation or qualification on the ability to serve in the
first instance. The statute begins with a findings section that sets out the basis of the
congressional action on this controversial issue.'72 The findings reveal several
important principles that should govern both the DoD implementation and the
perspective from which courts reviewing the policy should approach it.
First, Congress was acting pursuant to a clear grant of constitutional power to
establish the qualifications and conditions of service in the military.' Second,
Congress made clear that the unique role and mission of the armed forces in
American society demands unique rules that may not be the same as those found in
other countries or in civilian society.'74 Third, Congress made clear the statutory
policy was aimed at creating and preserving military effectiveness and cohesion.'75
Noticeably absent from the findings section is any indication that military readiness
was being balanced against the individual interests of homosexuals who wished to
serve. In other words, combat effectiveness, not accommodation of homosexuals,
either individually or as a class, was the purpose of the statute. Fourth, Congress set
out the factual predicate for the long-standing professional military judgment that
homosexuality is incompatible with military service and carried that principle
forward into the new law.'76 Both the House and Senate reports specifically note
that the statute recognizes and adopts the principle that homosexuality is
incompatible with military service."'
The structure, function, and legal theory underlying the statutory separation
policy is identical to the 1981 policy. The differences between the exact wording
in the 1981 policy and the statute are minor and the Senate Report noted they were
merely clarifications and were not changes in policy.' Equally as important, the
Senate Report specifically adopted the judicial interpretation that had been
developed under the 1981 policy and clearly expressed the intent that the statute be
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying
sexual desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand to
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in
subparagraph (A).
172. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a) (West Supp. 1995).
173. See id. § 654(a)(1)-(3).
174. See id. § 654(a)(4)-(12).
175. See id. § 654(a)(13)-(14).
176. See id. § 654(a)(15).
177. See S. REP., supra note 132, at 293 ("The findings reflect long standing Department of
Defense policy, as set forth in DoD Directive 1332.14, that '[h]omosexuality is incompatible with
military service .... '"); H.R. 103-200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 287 (1993) [hereinafter H. REP.]
("[T]he committee carried forward the fundamental tenets upon which the DOD policy regarding
homosexuals has long been based. In short, the committee concludes that homosexuality is
incompatible with military service.").
178. See, e.g., S. REP., supra note 132, at 290 ("The committee views... [the substitution of the
phrase 'propensity or intent' for the phrase 'desire or intent'] as a useful clarification that will not
affect the practical effect of the policy.").
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interpreted consistent with those cases.179 Like the 1981 policy, the statute defines
"homosexual" in terms of conduct or the propensity to engage in conduct and then
excludes the class from service. Like the 1981 policy, the statutory policy permits
servicemembers who are facing discharge for making a statement that identifies
them as a homosexual to rebut the presumption that they are, in fact, a member of
the excluded class.
Significantly, Congress did not say that "sexual orientation" was a private
matter or that it was a benign, non-disqualifying factor. The law did not define
"sexual orientation" or try to artificially separate homosexual orientation from
homosexual conduct. Instead, Congress specifically noted that when a person
revealed he or she had a "homosexual orientation," the statute presumed the
individual was a homosexual, i.e., one who engages in, intends to engage in, or has
a propensity to engage in homosexual acts.' In this respect, the statute mirrored
the 1981 policy and differed markedly from the July 19th policy. Thus, under the
statute, a statement of homosexuality logically and legitimately raises a presumption
that the individual is referring to the only class defined under the statute:
homosexual. And that class, of course, is a class defined by conduct or the
propensity to engage in conduct.
Consistent with the July 19th policy, the statute required recruits to be briefed
on the policy and the policy itself be set out in the various enlistment or accession
documents. 8 ' Rather than codify the July 19th policy of not asking recruits if they
engaged in or intended to engage in homosexual acts, the statute expressed the sense
of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should retain the discretion to "reinstate
accession questions if the Secretary determines that it is necessary to effectuate the
restrictions on homosexuality."' 2
Congress, however, chose not to legislate any specific investigative guidance
such as that contemplated by the July 19th policy. Instead, Congress left
investigations where they had been under the 1981 policy, as a matter of Secretarial
discretion with the caveat that any published guidelines would not place "unusual
restrictions on the authority of commanders to initiate investigations' 83. .. [and that
commanders] should have great discretion as to what constitutes sufficient
information to begin an inquiry.., about behavior or actions that could have an
impact on unit cohesion, morale, welfare and discipline."' 4
The statutory policy mirrored the 1981 policy in all material respects, 8 1 was
consistent with the July 19th policy where that policy was consistent with the 1981
179. See id. at 285, 294 (favorably citing cases upholding 1981 policy and specifically rejecting
the contrary holding of the district court in Meinhold v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal.
1993)).
180. See id. at 294.
181. Compare 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(c) & (d) (West Supp. 1995) with Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News
Release, supra note 140.
182. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 546(d), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993); S. REP., supra note 132, at 297.
183. S. REP.,supra note 132, at 291.
184. H. REP., supra note 177, at 289.
185. CompareDEP'TOFDEFENSEDIREcTIvENo. 1332.14,supra note 56, with 10 U.S.C.A. § 654,
supra note 171.
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policy, but omitted certain aspects of the July 19th policy that seemed to cause the
most confusion and concern during committee hearings.
Equally as important, Congress made no mention of passing a law to
accommodate homosexuals or creating a situation where they could serve under
color of law like the July 19th policy contemplated. 86 By adopting the principle
underlying the 1981 policy that homosexuality is incompatible with military service,
it would have been illogical and inconsistent to say that homosexuality in some
circumstances is compatible with military service.'87 Congress legislated on a class-
based presumption that homosexuals, as a class, have a propensity to engage in
homosexual acts.'88 The statute excludes the class from service to prevent the
disruption that homosexual activity within the military environment will cause. The
rebuttable presumption under the statute is the same as under the 1981 policy: the
individual can rebut whether they are a member of the class; they cannot rebut the
class definition or claim that while they are, in fact, members of the class they will
not act in accordance with their admitted propensity. Neither the 1981 policy nor
the statutory policy placed the risk on the military that a given homosexual would
not be able to live up to his or her claim to be an exception to the class definition.' 89
Thus, like the 1981 policy, the statutory policy is a class-based exclusion policy
premised upon the principle that homosexuality is defined by and inextricably linked
to homosexual conduct and is, therefore, incompatible with military service.
An analysis of the statutory policy in light of the existing standard of review
reveals that the statute should easily pass rational basis review.
1. Rational Basis Review
In Heller v. Doe'90 the Supreme Court reviewed the principles applicable to
rational basis review of legislative classifications challenged under equal protection
principles. In summarizing the law, the Court reviewed a long line of cases and
distilled the following principles:
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis "is not a license.., to judge
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Nor does it authorize "the
judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of...
policy determinations... that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
186. But see David A. Schlueter, Gays & Lesbians in the Military: A Rationally Based Solution
-to a Legal Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 393, 395-98 (1994) (concluding 10 U.S.C.A. §
654 permits homosexuals to serve).
187. See H. REP., supra note 177, at 288 ("[T]he committee concluded that any effort to create
as a matter of policy a sanctuary in the military where homosexuals could serve discreetly and still be
subject to separation for proscribed conduct would be a policy inimical to unit cohesion, morale,
welfare, and discipline, unenforceable in the field, and open to legal challenge.").
188. S. REP., supra note 132, at 284.
189. Id. ("It would be irrational, however, to develop military personnel policies on the basis that
all gays and lesbians will remain celibate .... [I]t is appropriate to take into consideration that when
a person indicates that he or she ... [is a homosexual] the armed forces are not required to wait until
the person engages in... [a homosexual] act before taking personnel action .... The government is
not required to prove in each individual case that a service member will not remain celibate or to
otherwise prove adverse impact on a specific unit.").
190. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
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along suspect lines." For these reasons, a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong
presumption of validity . . . . Further, a legislature that creates these . . .
[classifications] need not "actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale
supporting its classification." Instead, a classification "must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
[M]oreover, [a state] has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification. "A legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data." . . . [C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis
review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect
fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review
because it "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality." "The problems of government are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and
unscientific."''
The Court also made clear that a "statute is presumed constitutional, and 'the
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.'"192 Thus, the law imposes an extremely
heavy burden on those seeking to overturn the statutory scheme.
2. Congress Can Forbid Homosexual Activity in the Military Environment
In Dronenburg v. Zech,' 93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit specifically held that the Navy policy
requiring discharge of those who engage in homosexual conduct serves
legitimate state interests which include the maintenance of "discipline, good
order and morale[,] . . . mutual trust and confidence among service members,
... insur[ing] the integrity of the system of rank and command, ... recruit[ing]
and retain[ing] members of the naval service... and... prevent[ing] breaches
of security."'94
After conducting extensive hearings on the impact of homosexuality on
military effectiveness, Congress found the interests protected by the policy in
191. Id. at 2642-43 (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 2643 (citations omitted).
193. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
194. Id. at 1398. Accord benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Secretary
of the Army, 641 F.2d. 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Belier v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); see also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It is not irrational ... to conclude that the criminalization of homosexual
conduct coupled with the general public opprobrium toward homosexuality exposes many
homosexuals, even 'open' homosexuals, to the risk of possible blackmail to protect their partners, if
not themselves.").
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Dronenburg were still valid: "The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a
longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique
circumstances of military service." '195
This aspect of the homosexual policy has never been subject to serious
challenge. Neither litigants nor courts have seriously questioned the military's right
to exclude individuals who engage in homosexual acts.' 96
3. It is Reasonable to Conclude that Homosexuals Will Engage in
Homosexual Conduct
Given that homosexual conduct adversely effects legitimate military interests
and such conduct can be forbidden constitutionally, the question becomes: May
Congress avoid the damage to legitimate military interests by excluding from
military service the class most likely to engage in the prohibited conduct? Every
appellate court to finally decide the issue under the 1981 policy has clearly answered
this question in the affirmative.'97 Congress agreed and concluded that "[t]he
presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards
of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability."'' 98 The statute is based upon a simple, logical, and reasonable
thesis: the more homosexuals there are in the military, the more homosexual
conduct will occur, and the more problems associated with homosexual conduct will
occur. Because there is no practical way to prevent homosexuals from engaging in
homosexual conduct-nor does the military wish to take on that task-the best,
most efficient way-and the way that is fairest to both the individual and the
military-to minimize homosexual conduct within the military is to exclude
homosexuals, rather than subject them and the armed forces to unrealistic
expectations and unnecessary administrative burdens.' 99
In enacting the statutory policy, Congress rejected the notion that homosexual
"status" is unrelated to homosexual conduct and accepted the common sense
proposition that homosexual status and homosexual activity are inextricably
related.00 Congress, the branch responsible for establishing the rules and
195. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(13) (West Supp. 1995).
196. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (."[H]omosexual acts' are forbidden to
military service members, and there is no dispute that laws forbidding such conduct are
constitutional.'), vacated sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). See also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding states may criminalize homosexual sodomy).
197. See, e.g., Steffan, 41 F.3d at 677; Marsh, 881 F.2d at 454; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1068;
Rich, 735 F.2d at 1220. See also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990).
198. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(15) (West Supp. 1995).
199. "[T]he fact that... persons of 'homosexual orientation' engage in or seek to engage in
homosexual conduct is as unremarkable as the fact that ... persons of 'heterosexual orientation'
engage in or seek to engage in heterosexual conduct. To pretend that homosexuality or heterosexuality
is unrelated to sexual conduct borders on the absurd." Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,
1361 n.19 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 957 (1990).
200. The policy "does not classify [a] plaintiff based merely upon her status as a lesbian, but upon
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regulations governing the land and naval forces, rejected the politics of pretending
that homosexuals, as a group, do not present a risk of homosexual conduct in the
military.
4. The Military May Avoid the Harm to Good Order, Discipline, Morale,
and Unit Cohesion That All Agree Homosexual Conduct Causes by
Excluding the Class Most Likely to Engage in the Prohibited Conduct
a. The Policy is Grounded Upon Factors Properly Cognizable
in Determining Oualifications for Military Service
There can be no doubt that maintaining a combat-ready military force is a
legitimate government interest. In fact, no responsible critic or commentator has
ever suggested otherwise. Instead of negativing every conceivable basis for the
policy, critics generally claim that because homosexual conduct is subject to societal
disapproval, the policy is based solely upon irrational fears and must fall under the
equal protection standards of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.2' A
review of Cleburne and the factors that are properly cognizable in determining
qualifications for military service, however, refutes this argument.
Cleburne involved a challenge to a zoning regulation that required a special
use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded but did not require a permit
for other types of group homes. The Supreme Court recognized there was a
difference between a group home for the mentally retarded and other types of group
homes that were freely permitted, but noted "this difference is largely irrelevant
unless . . . [the home for the mentally retarded] . . . would threaten legitimate
interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses... would not. '20 2  The city
argued a special permit was required, (1) to control the size of the home and number
of occupants in order to limit population density in the surrounding area; (2) because
of doubts about legal responsibility for actions of the residents of the home; (3)
because the home would be located in a flood plain; (4) because of fear that students
in a nearby school would harass the residents; and (5) because of negative attitudes
of property owners within 200 feet of the proposed home as well as fears from
elderly residents of the neighborhood.2 3  The Court noted that proffered
justifications one, two, and three would apply to all group homes and provided no
explanation for different treatment of the home for the mentally retarded.
reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and in the future." Marsh, 881 F.2d at
464. See also S. REP., supra note 132, at 266, 285, 294.
[DoD] issued a conduct-based policy; . . . [u]nder current DoD policy, a
servicemember's admission... [of homosexuality] provides a basis for discharge
because the admission establishes a rebuttable presumption that the individual is a
person who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts
.... The policy setting forth the grounds for discharge is conduct-based.
Id.
201. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See Williams, supra note 118 at 942-47.
202. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
203. Id. at 448-49.
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Regarding justification four, the Court observed that about thirty mentally
retarded youths actually attended the school and that fears of harassment were vague
and undifferentiated. The fifth justification, the negative attitudes of the nearby
property owners and the fears of elderly residents, were similarly unexplained and,
importantly, were unrelated to any factor otherwise properly cognizable in the
legitimate exercise of land use zoning. The Court concluded that requiring a special
use permit "appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded. ' '204 In striking down the zoning ordinance, the Court held that "mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable
in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the
like." 0 5
Reading Cleburne simply to say "negative attitudes" or "fears" can never
support a classification scheme challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is
wrong. Moreover, applying such an argument to the statutory homosexual exclusion
law is overly simplistic, misapplies the Supreme Court's rational basis review
standards, misperceives the basis of the statutory policy, improperly equates
society's long-held opprobrium of homosexual practices with irrational prejudice,
and assumes the purpose of the policy is to stigmatize or punish homosexuals rather
than to contribute to combat effectiveness.
Assuming an element of "fear" or "negative attitudes" toward homosexuality
are present to some degree in society generally and in the military in particular, a
proper application of Cleburne requires an analysis to determine whether the
"negative attitudes" or "fears" are "unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable" in the policy area under review. In the context of the homosexual
policy, the question is whether society's disapproval of homosexual conduct is
substantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in developing military
service qualifications designed to maintain unit cohesion and enhance combat
effectiveness.
Cleburne does not require Congress and the military to risk a reduction in
combat effectiveness. Cleburne holds that government may not impose a policy
solely for the purpose of disadvantaging a particular group or class.20 6 In its review
of the policy, Congress carefully considered the purpose of the military, the unique
nature of military service, the key elements that must be present to successfully
accomplish a military mission, the function of personnel policies in building a force
capable of successfully accomplishing the mission, and finally, the need for a policy
excluding homosexuals in order to raise and maintain a force capable of success on
the battlefield. These factors are properly cognizable in developing military
personnel policies. A review of these factors underscores the legitimacy of the
204. Id. at 450.
205. Id. at 448.
206. See ROTUNDA, supra note 97, § 15.4. The authors state:
[T]he [Cleburne] Court invalidated the legislation under the equal protection
rationality standard because the state could assert no interest to support the legislation
other than a desire to discriminate against the disfavored group. Such laws violate equal
protection because the desire to discriminate cannot in itself supply a justification for the
discriminatory classifications.
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governmental goals and supports the rational basis of the policy choice made to
achieve those goals.
(1) The Purpose of the Military
"The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in
combat should the need arise."20 7 This straightforward statement of the need for a
modern armed force is not open to debate. Furthermore, since this fundamental
statement of purpose was made by the branch of government specifically entrusted
with raising and supporting armies, there can be no doubt that the purpose is a
legitimate one.2"8 Certainly the purpose of the armed forces is a properly cognizable
factor in establishing qualifications for service.
(2) The Unique Nature of Military Service
Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that-(A) the
extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique conditions of
military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion, require that the military
community, while subject to civilian control, exist as a specialized society; and
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and
traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would not
be acceptable in civilian society.2"
This principle is also beyond debate.210 In explaining the unique nature of
military service to Congress, General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army,
pointed out the essential difference between military and civilian life:
What separates us from civilian society is the ultimate sacrifice, the sacrifice of
our lives for our country. We have to sublimate everything that we do to selfless
service to our Nation. Duty, honor, country .... [I]t is, in fact, that mission, the
protection of the Nation, which must govern everything that we do.2"'
Not only does the military differ from civilian life in the degree of sacrifice it
requires soldiers to be prepared to make, it differs on the day-to-day living basis as
well. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained:
207. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
208. See also Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) ("[I]t is the primary business of armies and
navies to fight and be ready to fight should the occasion arise.").
209. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(8) (West Supp. 1995).
210. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("The essence of military service 'is the
subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service."'); Schlesinger
v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) ("[T]he military must insist upon a respect for duty and a
discipline without counterpart in civilian life."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("[T]he
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society."); Orloffv. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian.").
211. S. REP., supra note 132, at 273.
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[T]he majority of our... [soldiers] are required to live in communal settings that
force intimacy and provide little privacy. It may be hard to contemplate
spending 60 continuous days in the close confines of a submarine; sleeping in
a foxhole with half a dozen other people; 125 people all living and sleeping in
the same 40 by 50 foot, open berthing area, but this is exactly what we ask our
young people to do.2"
To provide a modicum of privacy in these situations, the military has
traditionally segregated bathing and sleeping facilities by gender. The presumption
underlying gender segregation is that people are sexually attracted to the opposite
sex. Thus, most people view being forced to sleep, shower, and use toilet facilities
with members of the opposite sex as an infringement of their privacy. When the
underlying presumption is not valid, e.g., when individuals find members of the
same gender sexually attractive, the invasion of privacy occurs even in gender
segregated facilities. This, in turn, disrupts the bonding and cohesion vital to
military effectiveness.2 13
Dismissing such concerns as only a "fear" that homosexuals will invade
privacy interests and claiming that such a fear rests upon "irrational stereotypes"
misses the point. Heterosexual soldiers who are stripped of the little privacy
military living provides and are required to share cramped living space with those
who are sexually attracted to the same gender do not fear a loss of privacy, they
have already experienced it. For example, a homosexual former soldier described
a preinduction physical as "pretty spectacular, I mean, 'cause you've got three
hundred naked men in one room. ...""' A lesbian discharged from the Air Force
wrote of her impression of barracks living at basic training:
I entered the military knowing that I was a lesbian, but also knowing that I
wanted to do what was right by military standards and stay there! But, by God,
when I got into basic, I thought I had been transferred to hog heaven! No damn
kidding! Lordy!
211
The issue is not whether a homosexual will physically assault a heterosexual.
The issue is the actual loss of privacy and discretion the soldier has come to expect
and society has heretofore provided in deciding when and to whom to expose one's
body. Recasting the privacy interests of heterosexuals into an irrational worry over
whether one would be assaulted in the shower, trivializes the legitimate interests of
soldiers and elevates the individual self-interests of homosexuals over the norms that
our society has heretofore maintained and protected.
As with the purpose of the military, the unique nature of military life is clearly
a factor that is properly cognizable by Congress in determining qualifications for
service.
212. Id. at 277.
213. Id. at 277-78.
214. MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE 61 (1990).
215. Id. at 11.
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(3) Essential Elements of Military Capability
"[H]igh standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion...
are the essence of military capability." '2 t6
During the recent Senate hearings several senior combat leaders testified to the
critical role of cohesion and discipline in winning wars. General Schwarzkopf told
the Congress, "In my 40 years of Army service in three different wars, I have
become convinced that ... [unit cohesion] is the single most important factor in a
unit's ability to succeed on the battlefield."21 7 General Powell told Congress that a
unit
must bond [together] as a fighting force before it is sent to the battlefield;...
[m]utual trust, common core values, self confidence, and realization of shared
goals help to form the cohesive military team; [c]ohesion requires the sacrifice
of personal needs for the needs of the unit, subjugating individual rights to the
benefit of the team. 8
Building cohesion is not something that is done overnight. "It does not
suddenly happen the moment the bullets come. If it was not there to begin with, it
is going to take a long time and some dead and mangled bodies before you get it. ' 2 9
Homosexuality adversely effects the development of unit cohesion because it
injects sexuality into a situation that should be sexually neutral. General
Schwarzkopf observed that "the introduction of an open homosexual into a small
unit immediately polarizes that unit and destroys the very bonding that is so
important for the unit's survival in time of war ... ""0
Even among homosexuals, the sexual tension created by living in close
quarters causes polarization and reduces cohesion:
People in each [homosexual] clique had their own rules and customs. Women
often paired up into butch/girlfriend couples or remained unattached, although
some lesbian cliques were made up only of butches. Adhering to their own
sexual folkways and taboos, butches rarely dated each other and had to be
careful about dating other butches' girlfriends in the same crowd. Rusty Brown,
who was a Navy mechanic during the war, 'automatically went to the table with
the butches' so that she could 'find out who was going with who - I didn't want
to get my head knocked off.' Couple relationships stabilized a lesbian clique but
breakups, rivalry, and jealousy caused fights and tensions that sometimes tore
a group apart.22'
216. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(15) (West Supp. 1995). See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 507 (1986) ("To accomplish its mission, the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps.").
217. S. REP., supra note 132, at 275.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 276 (quoting testimony of Dr. David Marlowe, Chief of the Department of Military
Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Medical Center).
220. Id. at 280.
221. BERUBE, supra note 41 at 103-04.
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A military leader, whether an officer or a noncommissioned officer, is unable
to effectively command or lead his troops if he loses the respect and trust of his
subordinates. This adversely effects morale, discipline, and cohesion. For the
homosexual leader, the loss of respect follows from engaging in conduct that may
be the natural expression of his sexuality.222
If, as senior military leaders believe and Congress found, unit cohesion, good
order and discipline, and morale are indispensable to success on the battlefield, there
can be no question that it is a factor properly cognizable in establishing
qualifications for service.
(4) The Function of Personnel Policies in Force Composition
The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose
presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed
forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion
that are the essence of military capability.223
In light of the purpose of the military, the unique nature of military service,
and the critical role of cohesion, no one can seriously challenge the proposition that
personnel policies must exclude those categories that military judgment and
experience has found do not enhance cohesion and combat capability. Applying this
self-evident principle, military policies are based upon professional military
judgment as to what categories or classes do not contribute to overall combat
effectiveness. This class-based approach reflects the fact that members of the
222. The personal account of two former officers provides an example:
When I went out on a cruise with the USS Constellation, there was nobody in the
squadron I knew who was gay, but I did, within a couple days, recognize a seaman I had
seen at a bar, and made contact with him. . . . That's how I was introduced to the
"Connie girls," a group of gay guys ... [who] for the most part . . . were really
flamboyant queen types, relatively young, mostly first tour. I was the only officer that
associated with them at all.
One night, I was dancing with this sailor and limboed down toward my back, and he
shimmied down on my face. All of these other guys who were not gay were sitting
around going, "Oh, oh, oh," and "Gross." I just loved it, loved the heck out of it.
HUMPHREY, supra note 214, at 163 (interview of Jim Woodward).
I ... started seeking out the 'tearoom' [anonymous sexual encounters in public toilets]
scene. The train stations were real good sources for that kind of stuff. I'd always known
it was against the rules.
A lot of people attending the trial were my troops, people who wanted to see me get what
they felt was my just deserts. You see, I was a hard-core squadron commander. I
believed everyone was there to work and we all had the same mission to accomplish, and
if you didn't play by the rules... I told them what the rules were .... I had very simple
rules-tough but simple. I was known as a kick-ass commander, and so the troops that
I had given reprimands to were there to watch me suffer ....
Id. at 228, 230 (interview of Paul Starr).
223. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(14) (West Supp. 1995).
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military are not "hired" for a particular job at a particular location for a particular
period of time. Rather, it recognizes the individual must become subordinate to the
unit and the mission. Wars are not won by individuals; they are fought and won by
cohesive teams of warriors who are ready to sacrifice their own lives for that of their
buddy.224
Class-based personnel policies, or managing by categories, allows the military
to expend its time, effort, and resources in those areas that professional military
judgment has found are most conducive to creating the cohesive units required for
victory in battle.225 Congress has imposed a number of restrictions on entry that
disqualify personnel irrespective of their individual suitability.226
Congress has also delegated authority to the Secretary of Defense to establish
"physical, mental, moral, professional, and age qualifications .".."227 Pursuant to
this authority, the services routinely exclude single parents, those with physical
disabilities or limitations, those not meeting prescribed educational and mental
aptitude standards, and those with a record of ingrained delinquency behavior
patterns.228 Within each of these broad categories there may be individuals who
could perform well in certain positions in the military. Enlistment qualifications,
however, exclude them on a class-wide basis.
Given the purpose of the military, it is not only reasonable, but imperative that
personnel policies exclude those whose presence will detract from the ability to
accomplish the mission. Managing by categories is a logical and efficient way to
select those potential soldiers that military judgment and experience has shown
stand the best chance of enhancing combat effectiveness. And enhancing combat
effectiveness is clearly a factor properly cognizable in developing qualifications for
service.
(5) Homosexuals Create an Unacceptable Risk to Unit Cohesion
The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the
high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability.229
With this legislative finding, Congress wrote into law the long-standing
principle that "'homosexuality is incompatible with military service ... [because
the] presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual
conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in
224. S. REP., supra note 132, at 275.
225. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 33, at 66-73.
226. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 504 (1983) (excluding the insane, intoxicated, deserters, and
convicted felons); id. § 505 (precluding enlistment by those under 17 years old and over 35 years old);
id. § 3253 (restricting enlistments to those who are citizens or permanent residents of the U.S.).
227. Id. § 12102 (1994).
228. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 33, at 5 (listing exclusion categories).
229. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(15) (West Supp. 1995).
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homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military
mission." 23
In reaching this conclusion Congress did not rely upon private prejudice,
bigotry, stereotypes, or mere negative attitudes and fears. Rather, it focused on
military effectiveness, unit cohesion, the unique nature of military life, and the
impact homosexual conduct in the military would have, ultimately, on success on
the battlefield.23" ' It simply cannot be argued that these factors are not properly
cognizable in determining qualifications for service.
The findings contained in the statute itself, as well as the legislative history,
clearly establish the purpose behind the statute is not to disadvantage homosexuals,
but to promote an efficient and effective military capable of winning our nation's
wars. As the branch specifically vested by the Constitution with the power to "raise
and support Armies,. . . provide and maintain a Navy.... [and] make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," '232 Congress found the
"primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in combat," '233
and that personnel policies must "exclude persons whose presence in the armed
forces would create an unacceptable risk to the ... high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." '234
Clearly, the purpose of the policy is to maintain an effective military, not to
disadvantage gay men and women.235 The statute is not "anti-gay;" it is "pro-combat
effectiveness."
Critics still argue that despite the "laudable goals" the policy seeks to achieve,
it is based ultimately upon private prejudice. This view fails to appreciate that the
disruptive nature of homosexual conduct in the military is not the result of some
bigoted attitude toward a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. 6 Rather, the
adverse impact on unit cohesion and combat effectiveness caused by homosexual
conduct is a result of forcing soldiers to share close living conditions that afford
230. S. REP., supra note 132, at 293 (quoting DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIR. No. 1332.14, supra note
56). See also H. REP., supra note 177, at 287 ("The committee concludes that.. . 'homosexuality is
incompatible with military service."').
231. S. REP., supra note 132, at 268-69, 278-79, 281-283. See also WELLS-PETRY, supra note
32, at 89-131.
232. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
233. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
234. Id. § 654(a)(14).
235. "[T]he [Senate Armed Services] Committee's primary focus and concern has been the
implications of any change in the current policy on the effectiveness of our armed forces to carry out
their mission to defend our nation." S. REP., supra note 132, at 268-69.
236, That the policy excludes those who are most likely to engage in homosexual conduct does
not mean it improperly caters to private bias or irrational prejudice. Assuming homosexuals engage
in homosexual acts is the result of simple logic, not bigotry. Even some critics of the current policy
have acknowledged the reasonableness of this presumption. See, e.g., Jeffery Davis, Military Policy
Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical, & Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REv. 55, 106 (1991)
("It is logical to assume that most [homosexuals] are going to act in accordance with their
preference."). Claiming discrimination on the basis of "homosexual status" merely avoids confronting
the real issue: the effect of homosexual conduct on unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. In
upholding Georgia's power to criminalize homosexual sodomy, the Supreme Court recognized the so
called "private bias" against such conduct was actually a legitimate ground upon which to base public
policy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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minimal privacy with those who may find them sexually attractive. It injects an
element of sexual tension and potential eroticism into a situation that must remain
sexually neutral to insure maximum combat effectiveness. It places an imprimatur
of the government on conduct the vast majority of Americans consider "always
wrong."237
To the extent these concerns reflect traditional notions of morality and societal
values, there is nothing in the law that disables Congress from considering such
factors in developing law and policy. The Supreme Court has held "[t]he law...
is constantly based on notions of morality." '238 The Court has recognized a
"substantial government interest in protecting order and morality. '23 9 Furthermore,
the Court has acknowledged that "a legislature could legitimately ... protect 'the
social interest in order and morality.' 240 If a legislature can rely directly upon
notions of morality in enacting laws applicable to the public generally, Congress
certainly can consider notions of morality in developing policies to preserve combat
effectiveness. This is true especially here where the need for cohesion, trust,
confidence, loyalty, and shared values is so important to success in battle. The
impact of the invasion of privacy that occurs when heterosexuals are forced to share
close living conditions with homosexuals, the introduction of a sexual component
into what should be a sexually neutral situation, and the reduction in trust and
cohesion produced by forced subjugation of widely held moral principles are all
factors that are properly cognizable in developing personnel policies to promote
combat effectiveness because they all affect the essential element of unit cohesion.
Precluding consideration of such factors results in elevating the personal interests
of homosexuals over what professional military judgment and Congressional
findings hold to be critical elements in winning on the battlefield.24'
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center does not reject the principle that
policies may be based upon traditional notions of morality. Bowers v. Hardwick
242
and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,243 which specifically approved basing laws on
moral precepts, were both decided after Cleburne. In fact, the distinction between
Cleburne, on one hand, and Bowers and Glen Theatre on the other, was the presence
of traditional notions of morality and decency that supported the legislation in the
latter two cases. The Court specifically recognized the power of the state to
"provide for the public health, safety, and morals .... "244 The law upheld in
Bowers was based upon a "millennia of moral teaching. ' '245 This legitimate moral
237. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, VIEWS ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 82 (Mar./Apr. 1993) (quoting
National Opinion Research Center 1991 survey that revealed 71% of those polled said sexual relations
between two adults of the same sex was "always wrong").
238. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
239. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991).
240. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (citations omitted).
241. As stated by the court in benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990), the military "should not be required by this court to assume the risk, a
risk it would be assuming for all our citizens, that accepting admitted homosexuals into the armed
forces might imperil morale, discipline, and the effectiveness of our fighting forces."
242. 478 U.S. at 186.
243. 111 S. Ct. at 2456.
244. Id. at 2462.
245. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring).
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basis was noticeably lacking in the City's justification of discrimination against the
mentally retarded in Cleburne.2"
While it may not be appropriate for the military leadership to assume the
position of the final arbiter of moral choices, 47 Congress certainly is not disabled
from recognizing and considering the prevailing moral values of the American
people in developing personnel policies applicable to the American people's armed
forces. Indeed, Congress has directed the Secretary of Defense to establish "moral
... qualifications for... enlistment .... "248 If "majority sentiments about the
morality of homosexuality" '49 can support criminal provisions, the consideration of
those same sentiments and the impact homosexuals would have on unit cohesion is
250
even more appropriate.
In the final analysis, Congress, professional military judgment, and common
sense all recognize that homosexuality is inextricably linked to homosexual conduct.
To pretend otherwise is absurd. It is also beyond dispute that the military may
prohibit homosexual conduct because it destroys unit cohesion and reduces combat
effectiveness. It follows that excluding the class most likely to engage in
homosexual conduct is a logical and reasonable way to minimize homosexual
conduct in the military. Those constitutionally responsible for our national defense
made the policy choice to exclude homosexuals rather than risk the damage to
cohesion that homosexual conduct causes.
The specific consideration of this controversial issue by the Congress under its
armies' powers, the logical, reasonable, and rational connection between
homosexuality and homosexual conduct, the application of rational basis review,
coupled with an unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions counseling deference in
judicially reviewing military policies,25' combine to make it highly unlikely, if not
246. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), is also relied upon by opponents of the policy for
the proposition that a classification scheme that treats homosexuals differently than heterosexuals
violates equal protection principles. Palmore involved discrimination based upon non-behavioral
characteristics (race) in determining parental fitness and was reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Obviously, there is no legitimate moral basis to support determining the fitness of a parent along racial
lines. A classification scheme based upon a non-behavioral characteristic and the application of strict
scrutiny distinguish Palmore and preclude its applicability to the homosexual issue.
247. General Powell testified before Congress that the military leadership should not "use our
official position to make moral or religious judgments on this issue." S. REP., supra note 132, at 279.
248. 10 U.S.C.A. § 12102(b) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added) (regarding Reserve
qualifications).
249. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
250. For a discussion of the appropriateness of using majoritarian notions of morality to support
the homosexual policy, see Arthur A. Murphy, et al., Gays in the Military: What About Morality,
Ethics, Character, & Honor?, 99 DICK. L. REv. 331 (1995).
251. See, e.g., Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) ("[J]udges are not given the task
of running the Army... ; the judiciary [must] be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 US. 57, 68 (1981) ("[W]e must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment... for that
of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by [Congress] .... ");
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[lIt is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence."); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986) ("Our review of military regulations.., is far more deferential than constitutional review of
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.").
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impossible, that the Supreme Court would find the statute unconstitutional. Thus,
the actions of Congress in legislatively addressing this issue would seem to put the
matter to rest, at least as far as the courts are concerned.
IV. DOD IMPLEMENTATION
Like most statutes that apply to the military, DoD was authorized to
promulgate regulations to implement the law.25 In view of the similarity between
the statute and the 1981 policy, the extensive congressional record supporting the
statutory findings and policy structure, as well as the long history of appellate
decisions upholding the 1981 policy, implementation of the new statute should have
been relatively easy. Little more than republishing the regulations applicable to the
1981 policy would seem to be required. Analysis of DoD's implementing
regulations, however, proves the old adage that "there's a right way, a wrong way,
and a military way" of doing things.
The DoD directives and service regulations reveal a rather remarkable
departure from the letter and intent of the statute. It appears that DoD implemented
the July 19th policy rather than the statute passed by Congress and signed into law
by the President. The following points demonstrate the inconsistencies and
contradictions between the statute and the directives.
1. The news release announcing the revised DoD policy stated the regulations
"implement the policy that was announced by President Clinton in July. 2 53 The
"overview" of the new directives that was included with the news release explained
that "[o]n July 19, 1993, the President and Secretary of Defense announced a new
DoD policy on homosexual conduct in the Armed Forces. DoD today is issuing new
directives implementing that policy."' 54 Neither the news release, the overview, nor
the memorandum from Secretary Aspin to the Service Secretaries directing them to
implement the new policy stated that the new directives were implementing the
statute.255 The news release and the overview merely noted the new directives were
"fully consistent" with the statute. The Aspin memorandum did not mention the
statute at all.
2. The new directives implemented the principle first introduced in the July
19th policy that "sexual orientation is a personal and private matter, and homosexual
orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by
homosexual conduct" '256 even though the law codifies the settled legal principle that
a claim to have a "homosexual orientation" raises a presumption that the person
engages in, intends to engage in, or has the propensity to engage in homosexual
acts. z5' A subsequent amendment to the implementing directives changed the
252. See Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 546(b), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993).
253. Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News Release, supra note 140.
254. Id.
255. Id.; Directives Implementing the New DoD Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed
Forces, Overview (Dec. 22, 1993); Memorandum from Sec. Aspin to Service Sec., Subject:
Implementation of DoD Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (Dec. 21, 1993).
256. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE No. 1304.26, encl 2, (B)(8)(a) (Feb. 28, 1994).
257. S. REP., supra note 132, at 294.
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wording of the quoted sentence slightly, but not its meaning, and has not altered the
manner in which the DoD has implemented its policy."'
3. The new DoD directives defined "sexual orientation" as "[a]n abstract
sexual preference for persons of a particular sex, as distinct from a propensity or
intent to engage in sexual acts"'259 and, consistent with the July 19th policy, officially
separated status (orientation) and conduct. Congress, on the other hand, declined
to legislate based upon amorphous concepts of "sexual orientation" or "sexual
preference" and specifically noted that "advocates of gay rights have expressly
linked sexual orientation to conduct.""26 Furthermore, Congress rejected the idea
that homosexuality could be "merely an abstract sense of identity" and recognized
that "[homosexuality] is intimately connected with conduct."26'
4. To further create the distinction between orientation and conduct that was
introduced in the Jtly 19th policy but absent from the 1981 policy and the statute,
the new directives defined "propensity" to engage in homosexual acts as "more than
* . . [a] desire to engage in homosexual acts . . ."262 even though Congress
specifically noted that using "propensity" in the statute instead of "desire" as in the
1981 policy was not a substantive change and would "not affect the practical effect
of the policy. 2 6
3
5. The DoD directives do not include the principle that "homosexuality is
incompatible with military service" as a basis for the policy even though Congress
said the statute carried that principle forward in the law.2" Furthermore, the
directives do not include either a reference to the law or its detailed findings in
setting out the basis of the policy promulgated by the directives.265
6. The new DoD directives permit retention of an admitted homosexual if the
person promises to refrain from engaging in homosexual acts while in the military"
even though Congress said that an admission of homosexuality raises a rebuttable
presumption of engaging in homosexual acts and that "a member cannot rebut the
presumption simply through a promise to adhere to military standards of conduct in
the future. '267 Training scenarios published by DoD contain the hypothetical of a
service member who admits to being a homosexual and at the administrative
discharge hearing the individual does not dispute that he claimed to be a
homosexual. The individual "promises, however, that he will not engage in any
258. The new sentence reads: "A person's sexual orientation is considered a personal and private
matter, and is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct
in the manner described in paragraph B.8.b., below." DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIREcTIVE No. 1304.26, encl.
2, (B)(8)(a) (Feb. 28, 1994).
259. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, encl. 2, T (0) (Feb. 28, 1994).
260. S. REP., supra note 132, at 283.
261. Id. at 282.
262. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, enc. 2, (J) (Feb. 28, 1994).
263. S. REP., supra note 132, at 290.
264. Id. at 293; H. REP., supra note 177, at 287.
265. Compare DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, enc. 3, (H)(1)(a) (Feb. 28, 1994)
with 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(I)-(15) (West Supp. 1995).
266. Sedvlemorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Assistant Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force to Assistant Secretary of Defense, Subject: Training Guidance for DoD
Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces; Teaching Scenarios 12, 13 [hereinafter Teaching
Scenarios].
267. S. REP., supra note 132, at 294.
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homosexual acts during the remainder of his term of enlistment ... [and] ...
presents no other evidence.2 68 In discussing whether the servicemember's evidence
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that he is, in fact, homosexual, the teaching
scenario allows the members of the administrative board to "determine whether that
promise.., was sufficient to demonstrate that he does not engage in homosexual
acts and is not likely to do so. ''269 Thus, the DoD regulations permit an admitted
homosexual to serve if the separation authority accepts a promise to adhere to
military standards of conduct in the future. In testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the DoD General Counsel explained that such a result was
indeed possible, even though unlikely:
The service member bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence. The decisionmaking authority remains the same as it is under current
[1981] policy. It is hypothetically possible that such a decisionmaking authority
could take that assertion to be sufficient. For example, if that assertion is
essentially, I was misunderstood, I did not mean it, it was ajoke. I mean it could
hypothetically suffice.
In the real instance that I believe you are trying to get at, Senator [Nunn],
in which someone made the statement knowingly and was not drunk, or had not
lost his or her mind, it seems to me it is very very unlikely that the mere
assertion that I am not engaged in acts, I do not have such a propensity or intent,
would be sufficient to carry that burden. The burden is placed on the service
member throughout. And I would reiterate what the Secretary said yesterday,
which is that is a very high burden and no one has ever done it.27°
Apparently not satisfied with the General Counsel's prediction as to the
likelihood of a particular separation authority accepting a promise of celibacy as
sufficient to rebut the fact that the servicemember was a homosexual, the Senate
Armed Services Committee specifically noted that "a member cannot rebut the
presumption simply through a promise to adhere to military standards of conduct in
the future; nor can the member rebut the presumption by a statement to the effect
that he or she has a propensity towards homosexuality but has not acted upon it."27'
The Senate viewed the claim of homosexuality to be just that and the servicemember
had the burden to prove that the original statement was "made in jest" in order to
avoid discharge.272
In spite of clear language and direction to the contrary, the DoD directives
have carried forward the July 19th policy choice that does permit admitted
homosexuals to serve merely upon a promise that they will not act upon their natural
propensity. In application, the "promise" of celibacy sufficient to warrant retention
under the DoD regulations need not be under oath or subject to cross-examination
at the administrative board hearing.273
268. Teaching Scenarios, supra note 266, no. 12.
269. Id.
270. S. Hrgs., supra note 17, at 772.
271. S. REP., supra note 132, at 294.
272. Id.
273. See Letter from Commander, Naval Base, San Francisco to Chief of Naval Personnel,
Subject: Report of Board of Inquiry in the Case of Lt. Maria Z. Dunning (Apr. 21, 1995) (an unswom
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7. The DoD regulations create the status-conduct dichotomy that first
appeared in the July 19th policy, but which is noticeably absent from the statute.
The directives define "sexual orientation" as an "abstract preference for persons of
a particular sex, as distinct from a propensity or intent to engage in sexual acts. 274
The directives also state that "sexual orientation is a personal and private matter, and
is not a bar to continued service... unless manifested by homosexual conduct...
",27' The directives create a class composed of all those who have an "abstract
preference for persons of a particular sex" and declare that members of this class can
serve in the military unless they engage in certain prohibited conduct. Thus, the
directives create a status-conduct dichotomy and declare status as a benign and non-
disqualifying factor. Conduct, on the other hand, is not so benign and will
disqualify one from service. One example of "conduct" that will disqualify an
"orienteer" from service is revealing that his or her "abstract preference" is for those
of the same sex. According to the DoD directives, the revelation of "an abstract
preference" for persons of the same sex "indicates a likelihood that the member
engages in or will engage in homosexual acts." '276 We are not told, however, how
the mere revelation of a characteristic that the directives clearly define as non-
conduct related can logically or reasonably indicate a likelihood of engaging in
certain conduct. This bit of illogic in the DoD directives departs significantly from
the 1981 policy structure and from the policy structure of the statute. As a result,
it seriously weakens the defensibility of the policy in court by introducing a free
speech issue that was not present under the former policy.
2 77
The legal and factual fiction that sexual orientation and sexual conduct are
unrelated was a central component of the July 19th policy. The status-conduct
dichotomy as a policy construct allowed the President to claim his new policy
"end[ed] discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." The fact this dichotomy
produced the illogical, irrational, and absurd rule that the mere revelation of a non-
disqualifying characteristic was disqualifying seemed lost on the proponents of the
July 19th policy and did not dissuade them from making the status-conduct
dichotomy the center piece of the DoD directives.
Congress, on the other hand, rejected the notion that sexual orientation and
sexual conduct are unrelated. The Senate Report noted "[h]omosexuality is not
merely an abstract sense of identity; [i]t is intimately connected with conduct. 278
The Senate Report also noted that advocates of gay rights themselves "have
expressly linked sexual orientation to conduct."279 In crafting the statutory policy,
Congress rejected the fiction of a status-conduct dichotomy and specifically adopted
statement, and thus not subject to cross-examination, of no intent to or desire to engage in homosexual
acts sufficient to warrant retention).
274. DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, (0), app. (Feb. 28, 1994).
275. Id. (H)(1).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655
(1992); benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990);
see also Williams, supra note 118, at 927-34.
278. S. REP., supra note 132, at 282.
279. Id. at 283.
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the structure of the 1981 policy which recognized the logical and rational connection
between sexual orientation and sexual behavior.28 °
8. The investigatory guidelines included in the new DoD directives reinforce
the notion that the policy administered by DoD is an accommodation policy that
permits homosexuals to serve under limited circumstances rather than a policy that
"exclude[s] persons whose presence in the armed forces would create an
unacceptable risk to... morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion....
The 1981 policy had no specific or published investigatory restrictions,
limitations, or guidelines. As a result, critics claimed that some commanders and
criminal investigation agencies abused their authority in trying to uncover closeted
homosexuals and discharge them from the service. The July 19th policy addressed
this allegation by limiting the sort of information that would support initiation of an
investigation into allegations of homosexuality and restricting the ability of criminal
investigators to initiate an investigation absent evidence of a criminal offense." 2
Congress, on the other hand, was concerned that restrictions or limitations on a
commander's ability to take action to protect unit cohesion would be counter-
productive.2"3 Congress seemed more concerned with the ability of the commander
to protect the combat capability of the unit than with allegations that in some
situations in the past some commanders and criminal investigators may have abused
their discretion, used poor judgment, or even violated existing laws or policies. In
any of these situations, the military already possessed adequate means to remedy
any abuse of command or authority. Instead of including detailed guidance on
investigations in the statute, Congress left the Secretary with the discretion to
promulgate administrative guidance, if necessary, provided the guidelines did not
establish "unusual restrictions on the authority of the commanders to initiate
investigations."284
The security investigation guidelines treat homosexual activity, the amount of
income tax a person pays, and membership in a trade union exactly the same for the
purposes of determining whether an individual is a security risk28 ' even though
Congress made homosexual activity a criminal offense and such activity could
subject the individual to blackmail or coercion.286 The guidelines forbid security
investigators from asking, "Have you ever engaged in sexual activity with a person
of the same sex?" 287 Even under the July 19th policy definitions, this particular
question deals solely with conduct and has nothing to do with "sexual orientation."
This limitation on inquiring into actual homosexual conduct seems to run counter
to even the July 19th policy's claim that "DoD judges the suitability of persons to
serve in the Armed Forces on the basis of conduct.""28 And it obviously runs
280. See id. at 282-5; see also Marsh, 881 F.2d at 454.
281. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(14) (West Supp. 1995).
282. See supra notes 146-166 and accompanying text.
283. S. REP., supra note 132, at 290-92; H. REP., supra note 177, at 289-90.
284. S. REP., supra note 132, at 291.
285. DEP'T OF DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERV., MANUAL FOR PERSONNEL SEC. INVESTIGATIONS.,
DIS-20-l-M, end. 18, (C) (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter SEC. INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL].
286. UCMJ, arts. 125, 133, 134.
287. SEC. INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, supra note 285, (C)(10).
288. Sec. Def. Dec. 22nd News Release, supra note 140.
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counter to the specific finding of Congress that "[t]he presence in the armed forces
of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion, that are the essence of military capability."28 9
When viewed as a whole, the DoD directives and regulations contradict the
expressed views of Congress in several important areas, are inconsistent with the
statutory scheme in other respects, and weaken the overall basis of the statute by
creating irrational and illogical presumptions. The 1981 policy and the statute
operate on the simple proposition that homosexual activity is inappropriate in the
military; homosexuals, as a class, engage in or are at least likely to engage in
homosexual activity; and that excluding homosexuals from service will reduce the
amount of homosexual activity that occurs in the military. While the logic of this
proposition may not be perfect and it may not hold true in every single situation,
there is a sufficient rationality to it to easily satisfy rational basis constitutional
standards.2 9°
The new DoD directives, on the other hand, rely upon executive fiat that
declares speech to be conduct and imposes a presumption of misconduct on the mere
revelation of a characteristic that the directives themselves define as non-conduct
related. The illogic is staggering and raises serious constitutional questions.29
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DOD POLICY
Two recent district court cases have reached opposite results as to the
constitutionality of the DoD policy. In Able v. United States,2 92 the court examined
the policy as implemented by the DoD directives and concluded it violated both
equal protection and free speech rights of the plaintiffs. Central to the court's
holding was the illogic and irrationality of discharging one for merely revealing
what the directives define as a non-disqualifying characteristic. The other case,
Thomasson v. Perry,293 on the other hand, focused primarily upon the statutory
scheme and ignored the inconsistent and contradictory DoD regulations in finding
that discharging one for admitting to being a homosexual did not offend
constitutional rights and protections.
Able was the first challenge to the new policy. Shortly after the implementing
regulations went into effect, six members of the armed forces filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the policy on free
speech and equal protection grounds. 4 Plaintiffs sought and were granted a
preliminary injunction preventing the military from taking any adverse
administrative action or initiating any investigation against them on the basis of
statements made and claims asserted during the litigation.295 Subsequently, the court
289. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(15) (West Supp. 1995).
290. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
291. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 972 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The Directives do not
explain how an 'orientation' means an 'abstract preference' if not revealed but if admitted becomes
evidence of a 'likelihood' to commit acts . .
292. Id.
293. Civ. A. No. 95-252-A, 1995 WL 470185 (E.D. Va., June 8, 1995).
294. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 968.
295. Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1995).
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dismissed for lack of standing plaintiffs' challenges to those portions of the policy
that required discharge for engaging in homosexual acts or for entering into a
homosexual marriage.296 Thus, the narrow issue before the court was whether the
DoD policy requiring discharge because "the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual" '297 violated plaintiffs' First and Fifth Amendment rights.29
In analyzing the policy under First Amendment principles, the court noted
that "Defendants... designed a policy that purportedly directs discharge based on
'conduct,' and craftily sought to avoid the First Amendment by defining 'conduct'
to include statements revealing one's homosexual status." 2  The court also pointed
out that "the Directives purport to distinguish between homosexual 'orientation' and
homosexual 'propensity,' defining the former as ... an 'abstract preference for
members of the same sex' and the latter as ... indicat[ing] a 'likelihood'. . . [the
individual will act upon his or her sexual preference]." ' 00 Finding the definition and
treatment of these terms nothing short of "Orwellian, '30' the court held the First
Amendment would not permit discharge for a mere statement of homosexual
orientation.3 °2
After finding the policy wanting under the First Amendment, the court held
that because the statements provision of the policy allowed heterosexuals to exercise
the fundamental right of free speech with regard to disclosing their sexual
orientation but denied homosexuals the same right, the policy violated the Equal
Protection component of the Fifth Amendment as well.303
In addition to finding the policy constitutionally infirm, the court criticized the
policy as based upon pretense rather than truth and noted that, even if the
Constitution permitted it, there was no congressional finding to support a policy that
encourages deception:
To invite someone with a homosexual orientation to join the Services, then to
throw that person out solely because that orientation is revealed from something
he or she said, and finally to pretend that the discharge was not because of the
person's orientation, might appear to all members, heterosexual and homosexual,
less than honorable, with incalculable effect on "high morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion."3"
Not surprisingly, the aspects of the policy seized upon by the court in finding
constitutional violations all stem from the inconsistencies between the statute and
the DoD directives. For example, the court noted the "Orwellian" attempt of the
directive to distinguish between "propensity" and "orientation."3 5 Neither term was
defined in the statute or in the 1981 policy because neither the statute nor the 1981
296. Able v. United States, No. 94 CV 0974, 1995 WL 116322 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1995).
297. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
298. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 972.
299. Id. at 975.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 976, 980.
303. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 980.
304. Id. at 979.
305. Id. at 975.
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policy relied upon a distinction between orientation and propensity. The
orientation-propensity distinction was first introduced in the July 19th policy. The
plain language of the statute and the legislative history reveals that Congress
rejected such a distinction as a basis for the statutory policy.306
The same may be said for the court's troubling comment concerning a policy
that "invite[s] someone with a homosexual orientation to join the Services, then..
throw[s] that person out solely because that orientation is revealed from something
he or she said .... -"0 Neither the 1981 policy nor the statute "invites" homosexuals
to join. In fact, both specifically exclude homosexuals as a class. Both were
premised upon the judgment that homosexuality is incompatible with military
service.3"' The July 19th policy, however, first created the idea that homosexuals
could serve under color of law but still provided for their discharge when they acted
in conformity with their sexual preferences. Despite Congress' rejection of such a
policy premise, DoD grafted the flawed logic of the July 19th policy onto the statute
through the implementing directives. The court specifically noted "[t]he Directives
do not explain how an 'orientation' means an 'abstract preference' if not revealed
but if admitted becomes evidence of a 'likelihood' to commit acts .... ,,3" This
approach to implementation lifts to prophetic proportions Congress' concern that
"any effort to create-as a matter of policy-a sanctuary in the military where
homosexuals could serve discreetly and still be subject to separation for proscribed
conduct would be a policy inimical to unit cohesion, morale, welfare, and discipline,
unenforceable in the field, and open to legal challenge. 310
The First Amendment violation found by the Able court and its application to
the Fifth Amendment was produced directly by the Department of Defense's
creation of an "Orwellian" distinction between homosexual orientation and
homosexual conduct. The 1981 policy did not rely upon such a legal or factual
fiction and, hence, did not implicate First Amendment concerns. 31, Congress
followed the structure of the 1981 policy in legislating in this area.31 2  The
Department of Defense's implementation of the July 19th policy instead of the
statute passed by Congress necessitated the efforts to "craftily ... avoid the First
306. See supra notes 171-189 and accompanying text.
307. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 979.
308. "The findings reflect long standing Department of Defense policy, as set forth in DoD
DIRECTIVE 1332.14, that '[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military service'...." S. REP., supra
note 132, at 293. "The committee carried forward the fundamental tenets upon which the DoD policy
regarding homosexuals has long been based. In short, the committee concludes that homosexuality
is incompatible with military service." H. REP., supra note 177, at 287.
309. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 972.
310. H. REP., supra note 177, at 289.
311. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir.
1991); benShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
312. S. REP., supra note 132, at 282-83.
Homosexuality is not merely an abstract sense of identity. It is intimately connected with
conduct .... While some individuals may view themselves as homosexual, gay, or
lesbian based upon thoughts that never ripen into a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts, advocates of gay rights have expressly linked sexual orientation to
conduct .... It is reasonable for the armed forces to take into account the potential
behavior of persons who define themselves as homosexual, gay, or lesbian.
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Amendment by defining 'conduct' to include statements revealing one's
homosexual status. 313
Significantly, the court neither discussed, distinguished, or even cited any of
the cases decided under the 1981 policy. Apparently, in the court's view, the DoD
policy under review was not similar enough to the former policy to warrant even
mentioning the unanimous line of appellate decisions sustaining the policy under
identical constitutional challenges.
The second case to consider the new law was Thomasson v. Perry.314 Shortly
after the Navy implemented the DoD Directives, Lieutenant Paul G. Thomasson
notified his superiors in writing that he was a homosexual. At the subsequent
discharge proceeding, Lieutenant Thomasson refused to offer any evidence to rebut
the presumption that he engaged in, intended to engage in, or had the propensity to
engage in homosexual acts. Instead, Thomasson said, "I will not go further in
degrading myself by disproving a charge about sexual conduct that no one has
made." '315 The Navy discharge board found that Lieutenant Thomasson had not met
the burden of proof the policy placed on him and ordered him discharged from the
Navy.
Prior to the delivery of the discharge certificate, Thomasson filed suit. He
sought and was granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Navy from
discharging him until resolution of the case on the merits. He claimed the discharge
for revealing his homosexuality violated the First Amendment, Equal Protection
under the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.316
In evaluating both lines of constitutional attack, the court relied heavily upon
the cases sustaining the 1981 policy and found that the policy did not infringe
Lieutenant Thomasson's constitutional rights.317 In so doing, the court ignored the
regulatory inconsistencies and contradictions the Able court found significant.
Rather than evaluating a policy that "invite(s) someone with a homosexual
orientation to join the Services, then throw[s] that person out solely because that
orientation is revealed. ,,,3 " as the Able court did, the Thomasson court noted
military personnel policies are often based upon "categories ' 3 9 and agreed with the
Steffan court's view that homosexuality and homosexual conduct are inexorably
intertwined.32
The Thomasson court did not even address, much less resolve, how a statement
of orientation, which the directives define as unrelated to conduct, could logically
or reasonably give rise to a presumption of conduct. Rather, the court accepted the
common sense notion that one who claims to be a homosexual is likely to engage
in or have a propensity to engage in homosexual acts. After accepting this premise,
313. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 975.
314. Civ. A. No. 95-252-A, 1995 WL 470185 (E.D. Va., June 8, 1995).
315. Id. at *6.
316. Id. at *1.
317. Id. at *9-16, 23. The court also found that the policy did not violate the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id. at *27.
318. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 979.
319. Thomasson, at *23 (quoting S. REP., supra note 132, at 273). See also Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "[t]he rule of law presupposes the creation of categories").
320. Id. at *23, n. 4.
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the court logically and legally concluded that the military may discharge a
homosexual before the admitted "orientation" gives rise to actual conduct and the
disruption that such conduct causes.32'
In one respect, the Thomasson and Able decisions are consistent: both courts
ignored evidence and information that contradicted their respective views of the
policy. Able failed to consider the legislative history indicating Congress adopted
the class-based structure of the 1981 policy and rejected the July 19th policy's
orientation-conduct dichotomy. Thomasson, on the other hand, did not attempt to
resolve the logical flaws in the policy created by the DoD Directives and applied the
precedent developed under the 1981 policy. In essence, Able reviewed the July 19th
policy and found it unconstitutional. Thomasson, on the other hand, reviewed the
1981 policy as codified by 10 United States Code, Section 654 and found that it
passed constitutional muster.
Ordinarily, courts called upon to review military policies apply the traditional
standards of review to the established policy. Here, however, both the Able and
Thomasson courts had to determine what the policy was before they could perform
their judicial review functions. They reached different conclusions because they
essentially reviewed different policies.
When two courts rule opposite one another on important issues the natural
tendency in our system is to let the appellate courts resolve the debate. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court could settle any conflicting rulings among the appellate courts.
This particular situation, however, is most unsuited for traditional judicial
resolution. Because, the Able court and the Thomasson court reviewed two different
policies, resolving the constitutional issues raised by these two decisions first
requires one to determine what the policy is before measuring it against
constitutional standards.
Answering this question is not a function of the courts. The political branches
have the constitutional authority to establish and define the policy, the courts merely
review the policy under a deferential standard.322 The significant differences noted
in this Article between the statutory policy and the regulatory policy produced the
seemingly contradictory court opinions. Arguably, both courts correctly decided
their respective cases based upon the policy as they found it. The ultimate question,
however, is still unanswered: What is the policy?
The significant discrepancies between the statutory policy and the regulatory
policy, if left uncorrected, will create a climate where the ultimate policy will be
decided by individual litigants who can persuade individual judges to adopt their
views. Thus, the judiciary, whose only role in setting military policy is to conduct
a very deferential review, and individuals seeking to vindicate their own interests
as opposed to the national interests of the roles and missions of the armed forces,
will have acquired by default the authority the Constitution vests in Congress.
If the Executive has not executed or implemented faithfully the law passed by
Congress it is Congress' responsibility to correct the Executive. It is an abdication
of Constitutional responsibility and authority for Congress to let the matter be
decided by the courts. Congress is charged with making the rules, the Executive is
charged with executing the rules, and the courts are charged with reviewing the
321. Id. at *23-25.
322. See Nunn, supra note 75, at 557.
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rules. By failing to take action to correct an erroneous implementation of the statute,
Congress turns its constitutional responsibility over to the courts and the Executive.
Congress, as a body, may not think the new DoD directives are inconsistent
with the statute. The failure to take any corrective action would certainly indicate
that may be the case. Indeed, litigants attacking the policy could urge the courts to
"defer to the military" in interpreting the statute and then highlight the internal
inconsistencies in the military's directives to illustrate the irrationality of the
policy.323
The better and more responsible course for Congress, assuming the statute was
intended to be a codification of the 1981 policy, as its language and legislative
history indicates, would be to require the Executive to faithfully implement the letter
and spirit of the law. This may be accomplished through "political persuasion" or
through additional legislation. In any case, Congress has the means and
responsibility to require the Executive to implement the law as passed, not the law
the Executive hoped would pass.
VI. CONCLUSION
After an extensive national debate over whether homosexuals should be
permitted to serve in the military, Congress concluded the long-standing
professional military judgment that "homosexuality is incompatible with military
service" was correct. It then passed a statute that in all material respects adopted the
form, structure, and function of the 1981 regulatory policy that had been upheld
repeatedly by the courts. DoD, however, implemented a regulatory policy designed,
in some degree, to deliver on a campaign promise to lift the ban on service by
homosexuals. The statutory policy and the current DoD regulatory policy are at
odds on several material points. These contradictions and inconsistencies provide
fertile ground for individual litigants and the judiciary to influence national military
policy in a way our Constitution never imagined. Congress, not the courts, has the
responsibility to resolve the discrepancies between the statute and the regulations.
Its failure to do so is an abdication of its constitutional responsibility.
323. In performing their task of statutory construction, courts should, of course, look to the
language of the statute and its legislative history rather than agency regulations that are contrary to the
intent of Congress. See, e.g, Sullivan v. Zelby, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990). Because the Department of
Justice, as part of the Executive Branch, defends the United States in these cases, it is not likely
Department of Justice attorneys will urge courts to reject as contrary to congressional intent the very
regulations the Executive Branch has promulgated. This is especially true here, where the author of
the implementing regulations, the DoD General Counsel Jamie Gorelick, is now the Deputy U.S.
Attorney General. Thus, plaintiffs will be able to exploit the illogical and irrational regulatory
provisions with impunity.
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